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Bosnia-Herzegovina

Radovan Karadzic, president of the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, "rejected U.S. accusations his forces slaughtered" 3,000 Muslims near Brcko, TANJUG reports. Karadzic stated: "The U.S. State Department is duped by unsubstantiated Moslem propaganda." He added that "the accusations were unfounded and challenged U.S. President George Bush to produce evidence of such allegations."

Croatia

After warnings from UN officials that plans to return thousands of refugees to their homes in Serbian-controlled areas "could spark widespread bloodshed," Croatian authorities "appeared to back down," AFP reports. Deputy Prime Minister Mate Granic said: "'No one can take on the responsibility' for ordering a move 'that would put human lives in danger,'" and he reportedly told representatives of the cities of Osijek, Vinkovci, Vukovar, and Baranja that "'special Serbian police' had been mobilised and rearmed to prevent the refugees' return." Deputy Mayor Branimir Glavas, main organizer of the refugees' return, said that although Croatian officials had previously "insisted" that the refugees would return on 29 September, this was "only 'a suggestion.'"

Yugoslavia

Federal—The Yugoslav Army General Staff issued a statement saying that "Croatia is regrouping its troops and bringing fresh forces to Slavonia in order to seize Baranja, Western Srem and eastern Slavonia, and support the forcible return of Croatian refugees to the U.N. protected areas," TANJUG reports. The General Staff statement noted: "The Army of Yugoslavia cannot peacefully watch the preparations for an aggression, and will be compelled to take adequate measures if force is used." It added that the General Staff "is confident that UNPROFOR will consistently follow its obligations, which would help avert the use of force by any of the sides."

Details of Former Prosecutor General's Apprehension

AU2909190492 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian
23 Sep 92

[Report attributed to the newspaper KOHA JONE: "Former Prosecutor General Maksim Haxhia Held at Rinas Airport"]

[Text] Well-informed sources state that border authorities apprehended former Prosecutor General Maksim Haxhia and confiscated his passport 20 September at Rinas Airport. They told him that he was not allowed to go abroad by order of the Prosecutor General's Office. The same sources say that this order was circulated to all border crossing points.

We asked Haxhia about this matter, and he said the following:

Being member No. 034480 of the World Lawyers Association and also holding membership in the British Lawyers Association and the group of specialists on the problems of juvenile crime attached to the Council of Europe, I received three invitations some 10 months ago that were scheduled consecutively.

I should have been in Cannes from 19-26 September, in Strasbourg from 27-30 September, and in London from 30 September-8 October to attend the ceremony opening the judicial year. I planned to deliver reports in all three countries.

Being a man of the law, I obeyed the summons of the the Rinas Border Point commander. His summons was quite correct and he was sympathetic, and that is why I obeyed him without even asking to see the order.

Starova, Swiss Delegation Discuss Relations

AU2909191792 Tirana ATA in English 0905 GMT
29 Sep 92

[Text] Delegation of the Swiss Confederation led by the under secretary of state, Ambassador Jenö Stahelin, arrived in Albania on September 28.

On the same day, official talks were conducted in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs between the delegation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Albania led by the Foreign Deputy Minister Arian Starova and the delegation of the Foreign Affairs Ministry of Switzerland led by the Under Secretary of State Jenö Stahelin.

During the talks, the interlocutors made a balance sheet of the actual relations between Albania and Switzerland and both parties underlined the fact that recently our bilateral relations are characterized by more frequent contacts. So far, some promising fields of cooperation are defined. The Deputy Minister Starova thanked the Swiss Government for the humanitarian aid and technical assistance for our country during this difficult period of transition. The Swiss undersecretary of state, Stahelin, in the context of the Swiss policy of supporting the Eastern countries, voiced the predisposition to intensify relations with Albania and the readiness for technical aid for it. He proposed also concrete fields in this direction such as reconstruction of the Pediatric Hospital in Tirana, investments for a pilot project for poultry, and other assistance in the field of agriculture. For this a group of Swiss experts will come to Albania to closely see our needs and to materialize the cooperation. The Albanian party valued the training in Switzerland of our cadres in the field of agriculture for a period of 18 months. This is an exception of the Swiss Government for Albania.

Speaking of the perspective of the bilateral relations, the heads of the delegations pointed out that opening of embassies in two respective capitals will contribute to further development of relations.

The interlocutors treated of problems of the present international situation in the Balkans and former Yugoslavia. The talks were conducted in a spirit of understanding.

Zhelev Meets EC, U.S., Russian, Japanese Envoys

AU2909144792 Sofia BTA in English 1333 GMT 29 Sep 92

[Text] Sofia, September 29 (BTA)—President Zhelyu Zhelev met with the ambassadors of the EC countries, the United States, Russia and Japan at a working breakfast today.

President Zhelev stated that in spite of the latest political developments in this country, which tend to create the impression of confusion in some people, the situation in Bulgaria is calm and stable. Dr. Zhelev stressed that two characteristics of Bulgaria's postcommunist development have won the world's respect for it: its peaceful transition to democracy, and the wise solution to the ethnic problem. Dr. Zhelev expressed his firm belief that the Bulgarian people, which has proved its pragmatism, industriousness and wisdom, will resist any attempt to be involved in rash moves.

The ambassadors showed interest in the relations between the state institutions, between the political and the nonpolitical forces, in the economic slump and the measures to counteract it, as well as in the forthcoming political events.

President Zhelev said the relations among the institutions are still in the making in a new democracy like Bulgaria. He expressed his view that the executive power should be exercised by a government of the Union of Democratic Forces. He said that even if there are cabinet changes (which is in the competence of the National Assembly) there must be continuity, because certain cabinet ministers have worked very well and have proved their worth.

The meeting was attended by Deputy Prime Minister Ilko Eskenazi and Deputy Foreign Minister Dimitur Tsanev.

Speech Zhelev Intended for SDS Meeting Issued

AU2909131692 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 23 Sep 92 pp 1, 4

["Full text" of speech President Zhelyu Zhelev was to read on 18 September at the Union of Democratic Forces political conference; "disseminated by the president's office"; "Dictatorship of Change"]

[Text] On 18 September President Zhelyu Zhelev walked out of the political conference of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] because of personal attacks against him that he assessed as groundless and unsubstantiated. On 22 September his office disseminated the speech he did not read. The following is the full text of the speech:

It has repeatedly been said that the SDS committed itself to carrying out a unique and unprecedented historical task, namely, to ensure the transition from totalitarian socialism to a normal democratic society. This was to be

done in a peaceful, bloodless, and nonviolent manner, while observing the basic principles and norms of parliamentary democracy and the basic human rights and freedoms. This is an incredibly difficult task that contains many contradictory elements, appearing to be incompatible and impossible to merge. Nevertheless, the practice in our country and in other countries of the former communist system shows that political solutions can always be found.

Our transition is unique also because of the way in which Bulgarian democracy was able to resolve interethnic problems. Obliterating the serious damage done by Todor Zhivkov's communist regime in anything related to the so-called "revival process," our democracy was able to find the formula for gradually smoothing out and healing contradictions, and subsequently, restoring good relations between Bulgarians and Turks that used to exist for a century before the "revival process."

Naturally, things cannot be forgotten at once, but the correct road has been followed, and we are all convinced of this.

In any event, Europe and the world respect us as a postcommunist democracy because of two things: Because of the peaceful transition from communism to democracy, and the democratic way in which our people mobilized their forces in the effort to resolve interethnic problems that caused incredible violence and bloodshed in other countries. It is the SDS that deserves credit for this, together with all its supporters and sympathizers, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms [DPS], and other democratic forces, including, of course, the trade unions, rather than separate individuals.

The reform that is being implemented in Bulgaria is one of the boldest among the reforms of the former socialist countries. However, it is also a reform for which the population pays a high social price and suffers deprivation, thus supporting the political force that implements the reform.

Now many people in our country are dissatisfied with the pace of transition and changes, and claim that changes in certain areas of social life have completely stopped, while in others, they have not begun at all.

The dissatisfaction already affects not only political circles, parties, and groups, but also trade unions and large sections of society. Therefore our task today is to clearly outline the obstacles that certain concealed supporters of restoration [of the regime prior to 1944] are trying to impose on us, as well as our own mistakes, with which we undermined the progress of the reforms. The obstacles erected by the figures of the former system are a natural phenomenon, and our own mistakes are also an objective result of the unique character of the road that does not appear in any political atlas of the modern world.

The dissatisfaction among the peasants is growing rapidly. They would like to really receive their land, but they

cannot do so, and when they do receive it, they lack the means to purchase agricultural equipment, fertilizers, chemical substances, and everything else that modern agriculture needs.

The sluggishness with which the land commissions and liquidation councils apply the law evokes justifiable concern. Even now one rarely meets people who have received a document that certifies their ownership of land. Thus the establishment of new private farms and real agrarian cooperatives is hindered.

We must not deceive ourselves by obliterating the border between our desires and reality. The lack of new structures in the villages creates a real threat for failing to harvest crops and sowing new ones in the fall.

The solution is in accelerating land reform, so that new, stable, and vital private farms and cooperative structures could be formed on the basis of private ownership of land. In addition, because of the priority importance of agriculture, the state should develop a social policy in that area. (There is no developed country in the world that does not conduct a preferential policy toward agriculture. Bulgaria, which is just emerging from the ruins, should not be any different.)

In the past the modern slogan was "To Immediately Change the System." At the rallies this slogan sounded like an oath. Now it has been replaced by another slogan—"Decommunization!" However, since decommunization is understood as merely replacing people, actually, nothing is being done: neither the system is being changed, nor is the country being decommunized. What is done most frequently involves the replacement of people within the system by other people who are usually incompetent.

I must express my concern about the delay in privatization, and the lack of interest on the part of most of the population in this process. Obviously, certain changes must be effected in the directions of and attitude toward privatization. This will create interest in it not only among the workers of a specific enterprise, but also among wide circles of the population. Such an interest will ensure political support and will give an impetus to accelerating privatization.

There is also a delay in the branch restructuring of the economy in the direction of giving up unprofitable branches and enterprises inherited from the past and orienting ourselves toward branches of national priority. The government is doing little in this direction and is prematurely leaving it to the market mechanisms to do it in a sporadic manner. However, at this time these mechanisms are not functioning sufficiently well and cannot always be an objective criterion of restructuring. At the same time the delay in privatization and the restructuring of the economy is accompanied by a sharp propaganda attack against private business. This has negative consequences for business confidence in the reform and objectively hinders its development.

Let us recall another matter: The SDS election platform explicitly stressed the need to have strong trade unions and develop a partnership with them as a guarantee of social peace and the success of the reform. Did we forget this promise?

All this allows me to say that the country is experiencing a period in which as a result of delaying the reform—returning the land and privatization—the SDS government faces the following dilemma: It can either face a further narrowing of its social base and political support, as a consequence of which it will be forced to resort ever more to administering, issuing decrees, and using coercive organs, i.e., to apply a characteristic administrative-bureaucratic manner of management or even its graver variant—an administrative-police dictatorship, or it can make a change in its policy that could ensure a constantly expanding social base of the government, and growing political support for SDS implemented reforms. In this respect the SDS has great reserves and possibilities incorporated in its own platform that is liberal in spirit and content.

However, all those reserves and possibilities in the SDS platform must be implemented and utilized, and this can happen only by speeding up the return of the land, privatization and economic restructuring. This in turn means to start speeding up the change in the forms of ownership.

I am not telling you a tale when I speak about this dilemma. We really face the dilemma I have mentioned because things have an objective internal logic of development. Whether we like it or not, this logic will force us to act one way or another, unless we envisage in time the measures necessary to eliminate the dangerous development of affairs.

Many recent events confirm that we are at a crossroads. The tension between the government and the trade unions, the government and the church, the government and the basic part of the press, the government and the extraparlimentary opposition, the government and private business, and so forth, outline a certain tendency.

A typical example in this respect is the government's rude interference in the affairs of the Bulgarian Eastern Orthodox Church through the Directorate on Religious Affairs. This is a repetition of a vicious model, familiar in our recent past, that shakes the Bulgarian public's faith in the supremacy of the law. The people are fearful that it will again be possible to have a government that does not operate on the basis of the law. For many decades this fear damaged the moral foundations of generations of Bulgarians. The schism in the Bulgarian Orthodox Church compromises the SDS, which assumed power in the name of tolerance and legality.

The government's attempts to impose censorship on television, especially Channel 1, and on BTA, also testify to this tendency.

Attempts to humiliate the Army through an inadmissible order that was about to illegally deprive 1,400 high-ranking Army officers of their higher education on the basis of certain fabricated criteria belong to the same category. We are talking about the Army that, throughout the entire period after 1989, was constantly loyal to democratic changes in the country and the SDS government that implemented those changes.

The attempts to block the Rakovski Officer Legion are typical. The pretext is being used that the legion was communist (who knows why!), despite the fact that our entire officer corps is depoliticized and seeks no other goal than to protect the professional-everyday life interests and patriotic ideals of the officers.

The formal existence of the basic institutions of power—parliament, president, government, and judiciary—is not a guarantee of democracy in any country. The separation of powers, strict observance of the prerogatives of power as laid down in the Constitution, and the fact that there is no political authority above them to control and command them, as used to be done by the Politburo—this is the mandatory prerequisite of democracy.

I would like to say a few words about parliament. During the transition period, as we progress from one system to another, when it is important to enact crucial laws in the economic, social, and political spheres, the role of the parliament is exceptionally and crucially important.

However, precisely because of this it is important to enhance the role of the parliamentary commissions, where not only laws are generated and the real discussion takes place, but also where specialized parliamentary control over various institutions of executive power is exercised. The authority and prestige of National Assembly members must increase because they are not merely members of their parliamentary factions, but also representatives of the people, responsible for the legislative activity of the entire parliament.

After my Boyana news conference I was much confused by the reaction within certain SDS circles, and especially by the attempt to distort certain ideas by deliberately changing their contents. For example, when I appeal for national consensus and understanding on the basic issues in the name of rapidly and successfully implementing the economic and political reforms, this is presented or interpreted as an attempt to engage in "collaboration with the communists," or an attempt "to impose a coalition government." It is needless to say that this is a speculative and rude distortion of my thesis, aimed at deceiving many of our supporters and democratically minded citizens, by disseminating the distortion through mass media.

Let us take another example. When I view decommunization as a comprehensive change of the system and the economic and social relations and structures rather than a mere change of people within the framework of the old system, there are politicians who deliberately present

this idea as an appeal "to make the victim embrace his executioner," and as an attempt to divert us from "seeking responsibility from the culprits of the national catastrophe." I have repeatedly pointed out that the culprits must be held responsible in accordance with the law, and that such a thesis does not in any way contradict seeking personal responsibility.

It is even more confusing when criticism directed at the government and its policy mistakes and shortcomings is presented as an "attack against the first democratic SDS government," in other words, against the SDS itself. I am one of the founders of the SDS, and I am concerned about the SDS. Therefore, I must criticize its mistakes without withholding anything.

Those attacks are even more dangerous when one understands that they show not only a misunderstanding of the serious nature of the situation but also an unwillingness to think about complex problems, to analyze them, discuss them, and subject them to an objective, calm, and prudent discussion from which the SDS could only benefit.

Finally, I would like to add the following: I am concerned about the attempt to monopolize truth and the democratic idea, and reject all supporters of democratic processes who think in a different manner, through ideological and agitation clichés and insults. The attempts to personify the SDS, the government, and the parliament, as well as the idea of democracy, is fatal for the future of reform and the progress of democratic changes.

Oktay: DPS 'Waiting for Events To Develop'

AU2909131592 Sofia OTECHSTVEN VESTNIK in Bulgarian 22 Sep 92 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Osman Oktay, National Assembly deputy and chief secretary of the Rights and Freedoms Movement, by Liyana Kirilova in Sofia on 21 October: "At Present There Is No Dialogue Between the Union of Democratic Forces and the Rights and Freedoms Movement"]

[Text] BTA reported that the leadership of the DPS [Rights and Freedoms Movement] notified Filip Dimitrov that it was impossible to hold talks between the two organizations on the evening of 21 September, as suggested in the invitation sent by the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces].

In principle the DPS leaders would agree to negotiate with SDS representatives on "certain political issues," but prefer that this should happen during the next few days because they had not appointed their representatives for the talks.

At the moment the DPS leadership is remaining silent about the development of "friction" with the SDS. Yesterday morning [21 September] DPS Chief Secretary

Osman Oktay gave several interviews, but in the afternoon he persistently sent the reporters away. The leadership is probably annoyed with the mass media, which were given the signal by Ahmed Dogan through his refusal to take part in Saturday's "Panorama" program [on 19 September]. Nevertheless, Osman Oktay was prepared to give an interview to OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK, although it took place standing outside the locked door of his office.

[Oktay] The first part of our political meeting has ended, the declaration is almost ready, but we will not publish it until Wednesday [23 September].

[Kirilova] Why have you decided to maintain silence?

[Oktay] We are waiting for events to develop, and we are making assessments and analyses. The situation changed following the SDS political conference, and we do not want to be too hasty.

[Kirilova] Does this change mean that the "friction" is on the way to being smoothed out?

[Oktay] I said that there is a change, but I did not say whether our assessment of it is positive or negative....

[Kirilova] What do you expect will happen?

[Oktay] So far the contact group appointed by the SDS political conference has made no official attempts to start talks. Asen Michkovski telephoned to tell me who the members of the contact group are, but their powers are not clear. The stance of some individual SDS leaders is worrying. We are waiting for the rally on Tuesday [22 September] to see what moves the political forces make.

[Kirilova] How do you assess the president's stance?

[Oktay] We fully support it.

[Kirilova] What about the letter from Vice President Blaga Dimitrova?

[Oktay] We were surprised, and we refuse to make any comment on it.

[Kirilova] Are the new "tourist trips with no return" being made by your electorate in any way connected with the DPS-SDS conflict?

[Oktay] Yes.

[Kirilova] Will your present stand intensify this process?

[Oktay] Quite the contrary, we expect changes for the better. We have been overwhelmed with telegrams and telephone calls supporting our actions.

DPS Advised To Declare Policies Openly

AU2909191992 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 24
Sep 92 p 6

[Emil Robev commentary: "Eye to Eye"]

[Text] The nervousness with which the leaders of the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] received the news of the "disloyalty" of the DPS [Rights and Freedoms Movement] during the last few days was more reminiscent of the conduct of a maiden suddenly abandoned by her betrothed than of the behavior of mature politicians. These politicians probably forget that political life in democratic countries is not a drama, tragedy, carnival, or vaudeville, but a continuous process of clashes and balancing of interests.

This axiom might better explain the "abrupt" changes in the attitudes of the DPS than to attribute them to intrigues by mafias and mysterious forces. Unbiased observers cannot deny that the DPS has kept to a very consistent line for at least the last five months. The movement certainly gave enough warning signals to its coalition partner. In the final analysis, it is perfectly logical for the DPS to claim in the declaration of its Central Council that the movement will never enter into a political alliance with the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party]. Whether it wants to do so or not, it would never be able to explain this step to its electorate, which is still tormented by fresh memories.

However, it is precisely these memories, coupled with the ethnic self-awareness of the DPS electors, that make many of them suspicious toward the organization's activities. Many people have not forgotten the statement made by Ahmed Dogan in June 1990 that "the road to Europe passes by way of the Bosphorus." The games that Dogan played with the exiled king in Madrid have been subsequently copied by so many politicians that one should no longer take them into account.

What should be done, then? It seems to me that the solution is to look reality straight in the eye. The DPS expresses both the ethnic and the social self-awareness of a not inconsiderable section of the Bulgarian people, and for this reason it is always better for it to play its game in the open.

BSP Advocates Talk With SDS, DPS

AU2909184192 Sofia BTA in English 1711 GMT 29
Sep 92

[Text] Sofia, September 29 (BTA)—The Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) believes that in its capacity as a ruling coalition the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) should nominate a new cabinet. Mr. Nikolay Kamov, a BSP leader, told journalists today. He said that the Socialists would declare their position only if the SDS and its ally, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS), fail to propose a formula for overcoming the crisis.

Today, however, the leaders of the BSP-led parliamentary faction are going to offer to the socialist MP's [members of parliament] to make a decision for the appointment of contact groups for negotiations with the other parliamentary forces—the SDS and the DPS. The Socialists believe that such negotiations are unavoidable

as the new chairman of the National Assembly should be elected in two week's time. Such election is impossible without negotiations—bilateral or, what would be best, trilateral, Mr. Kamov said.

The BSP has not discussed any candidatures for the parliamentary leadership. When the National Assembly started its work the Socialists refused to nominate their National Assembly deputy chairman and nominate representatives for election as leaders of the parliamentary committees. But now they see a possibility of tangible changes in the political line and may change their position.

SDS Council Reaffirms Support of Dimitrov

AU2909185492 Sofia BTA in English 1706 GMT 29 Sep 92

[Text] Sofia, September 29 (BTA)—At its meeting today the National Coordinating Council of the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) specified the powers of the contact groups for talks with President Zhelev and the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS) (the ethnic Turks' organization, until recently parliamentary ally of the ruling coalition). The two contact groups were elected at the SDS political conference ten days ago. No further details on the mandate of the groups were announced at a news conference after today's meeting.

According to SDS spokesman Mikhail Nedelchev, no talks have been held so far with President Zhelyu Zhelev. He set a precondition to receive the videotape of the conference so that he could get familiar with all statements.

Mr. Asen Michkovski MP [member of parliament] of the SDS, member of the DPS contact group, writes in today's PODKREPA that the movement set the same condition at preliminary talks. According to Mr. Michkovski, the SDS contact group did not get any specific powers from the leadership of the coalition while the DPS representatives had a clear and specific mandate.

Mr. Michkovski, a critic of the Filip Dimitrov government and close to the Podkrepa Labour Confederation, believes that the ruling coalition does not take a serious view of the talks with the DPS. He said that the SDS-affiliated United Democratic Centre had a serious idea about a discussion on economic problems and dialogue on a possible formation of a SDS/DPS coalition government.

Last week the DPS withdrew its political confidence from Prime Minister Filip Dimitrov. In an interview for today's OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK Mr. Yunal Lyutfi, a senior DPS functionary, claims that an alternative to the incumbent government would be ready within two weeks.

"SDS has not changed its view on the question of the government," SDS floor leader and National Coordinating Council deputy leader Aleksandur Yordanov told

the press today. In its political conference declaration the SDS expressed firm support for the government and the prime minister, stressing that if a vote of no-confidence is passed on the cabinet, it will ask Mr. Dimitrov to form a new one.

On a motion of the Radical Democratic Party, the SDS Coordinating Council today decided to draft and sign three documents. Two of them will be intra-coalition and regulate the unity of action between the MP's of the different parties and organizations affiliated to the ruling coalition, and a third one will specify the forms of parliamentary partnership between the SDS and the DPS.

New Government 'Within Two Weeks' Predicted

AU2909131092 Sofia BTA in English 1214 GMT 29 Sep 92

[Text] Sofia, September 29 (BTA)—The ethnic Turks' Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS) is persisting in its attacks against the government of the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) and against Premier Filip Dimitrov.

In an interview for OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK, the spokesman for the DPS, Mr. Yunal Lyutfi, states categorically that an "alternative government headed by a new prime minister will be formed within two weeks." In October Bulgaria will have a reformed and stable cabinet, Mr. Osman Oktay, MP [member of parliament] and organizational secretary of the DPS, says in an interview for the 168 CHASA weekly. The DPS will not have its ministers in the new cabinet but, according to Mr. Yunal Lyutfi, the time for including DPS ministers in the cabinet would be ripe soon.

Asked what gave him grounds to think so, Mr. Yunal Lyutfi said "I know," and added that in the SDS there are people who are "mature and real democrats, unlike Filip Dimitrov and those close to him."

Last week the DPS leaders declared that they divest Filip Dimitrov of their political confidence, but said they would not hurry in demanding his resignation officially. In his interview for 168 CHASA, Mr. Osman Oktay said that the DPS wants to see what the new cabinet would be like before filing an official demand for the resignation of Filip Dimitrov. "The DPS has never retracted its word," Mr. Yunal Lyutfi said in his interview. Last week National Assembly Chairman Stefan Savov was forced to hand in his resignation under the pressure of the DPS. At the October 1991 parliamentary elections the SDS defeated the former Communist Party by a narrow margin, and with its 24 MP's the DPS plays a key role in parliament.

In his interview today Mr. Lyutfi also said that there were more and more people in the SDS supporting the ideas of the DPS for changing the cabinet, quoting a statement of DPS leader Ahmed Dogan of last week, who said that this idea was supported by about 50 MP's of the

ruling coalition (totalling 110). The spokesman for the DPS denied the rumour that Foreign Minister Stoyan Ganev was the movement's favourite candidate for the premier's post. In an interview for 168 CHASA, Stoyan Ganev himself (who holds the presidency of the current session of the UN General Assembly) says that he has no ambitions for different post.

For several weeks now the DPS has been persisting in its criticism of the SDS. But Yunal Lyutfi was exceptionally severe in his criticism in today's interview. According to him, Filip Dimitrov's cabinet is thinking only how to stay in power instead of solving the economic and political problems.

At its political conference on September 18 and 19 the SDS decided on dialogue with the leaders of the movement. So far, however, the contacts have not yielded any particular results. Talks on the essence of the problems are expected to start this week.

Since last Friday [25 September] representatives of the ruling coalition have been openly speaking about a coalition government with the DPS. The idea was launched by the United Democratic Centre. Citing anonymous sources, the KONTINENT daily asserts today that at its last week's session the parliamentary group of the SDS decided to start negotiations on a coalition cabinet with the DPS. Prime Minister Filip Dimitrov reminded journalists yesterday that negotiations on the participation of the DPS in the cabinet of the SDS have already been held in the past and not once, at that. "The inclusion of a loyal coalition partner in the cabinet is subject to discussions but change for the sake of change is out of question," said the prime minister, who is also leader of the SDS.

Prosecutor Disapproves of Inquiry Commissions

AU2809200292 Sofia BTA in English 1630 GMT 28 Sep 92

[Text] Sofia, September 28 (BTA)—The stripping of Socialist M.P. [member of parliament] Andrey Lukanov of parliamentary immunity (Andrey Lukanov has been

accused of being responsible for the economic catastrophe in Bulgaria) and the demand for bringing to trial another M.P. of the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP)—Dimitur Velev, may be followed by other similar demands.

At present the Prosecutor General's office is investigating reports it has received about crimes perpetrated by other M.P.'s as well, Mr. Ivan Tatarchev, prosecutor general of the republic, told BTA today. Last week he addressed parliament with the request for divesting BSP M.P. Dimitur Velev of his parliamentary immunity. According to the evidence presented to the leadership of parliament, during the so-called regeneration process (the coercive assimilation campaign against the ethnic Turks launched during Zhivkov's regime) Dimitur Velev, who then headed the Khaskovo Municipal Council, committed a crime by ordering the tearing down of the houses of the ethnic Turks in a whole residential district in the City of Khaskovo (southeastern Bulgaria).

Under the operative constitution such a request by the prosecutor general should be discussed within a fixed period of time (at the following plenary sitting of parliament). But on the motion of the parliamentary group of the BSP, parliament voted a resolution for setting up a commission of inquiry to study the evidence presented by the prosecutor general and the M.P. in question himself. The six-member commission which will include two representatives of each parliamentary group will have to complete its inquiry within two weeks. According to the parliamentary group of the BSP, the evidence presented by the prosecutor general does not suffice to adopt a decision on this issue without making additional inquiries.

But Prosecutor General Ivan Tatarchev believes that the setting up of a commission of inquiry is a delaying tactic. He told BTA that the law makes no such provisions and that according to the Constitution, the request of the prosecutor general should be discussed immediately. Mr. Tatarchev did not specify any other M.P.'s on whom the commission will make inquiries. "I do not have the right to reveal any further information," he added.

Knazko Answers Antall Criticism of Dam Project

AU3009102192 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in
Czech 26 Sep 92 p 3

[Marta Ruzickova report: "Milan Knazko Comments"]

[Text] Nuremberg—Immediately after the gala opening of the Danube Canal and prior to his departure for a canal cruise, Slovak International Relations Minister Milan Knazko said the following in connection with Hungarian Prime Minister Antall's speech: "Much to the surprise of everyone present, Prime Minister Antall used his speech to level accusations at Slovakia. He abused the situation and, instead of speaking on behalf of all the countries, he attacked our country without giving us a chance to defend ourselves. I think this is extremely regrettable and heightens tension between Slovakia and Hungary." He also said that Hungary's political representatives are trying to politicize the events of recent weeks, events of a matter-of-fact nature. According to him, this does not affirm good and friendly intentions. Milan Knazko thinks the Hungarians should reassess their policy toward the Slovak and Czech Republics.

During the cruise, Milan Knazko described Antall's arguments as unqualified. He did not have the right to make such a statement, he said. He was authorized by all the Trans-Danubian states to address this forum because the Danube Commission is based in Budapest. His claims about the ecological damage caused by the Gabčíkovo project, his attitude toward the borders, and his claim that the Czechoslovak side is taking unilateral steps are unfounded. On the contrary, the project is ecologically desirable and it is the Hungarian side that is taking unilateral steps, he said.

Slovak Constitution To Go Into Effect 1 Oct

AU2909151392 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 25 Sep
92 p 1

["sh"-signed report: "The Constitution of the Slovak Republic Will Go Into Force on 1 October"]

[Text] The Constitution of the Slovak Republic has been assigned the number 460/1992. It will be promulgated (published) in part 90 of ZBIERKA ZAKONOV [Legal Gazette], which will be sent out on 1 October 1992. This means that the Constitution of the Slovak Republic will go into force on 1 October (naturally, with the exception of those articles the coming into effect of which has been delayed until the appropriate changes in the CSFR's constitutional arrangement are effected). This means, among other things, that, with effect from 1 October, we are going to have the National Council of the Slovak Republic, instead of the Slovak National Council.

Havel Outlines Political Philosophy, Plans

AU3009094692 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in
Czech 24 Sep 92 pp 1, 7

[Interview with former CSFR President Vaclav Havel by Jiri Leschtina and Petr Novacek; place and date not given: "I Could Not Stand Carrying Out Other People's Instructions"]

[Text] [MLADA FRONTA DNES] What are you doing now, what are you involved in?

[Havel] My program is fuller than I had hoped. I receive many invitations from abroad, most of which I refuse, but some of which I accept, and many invitations from different parts of our Republic; I also have a great deal of correspondence and numerous and various working meetings—with politicians, artists, and friends from home and abroad. Many people are under the misapprehension that I now have limitless free time and want to talk to me or want to invite me somewhere or want to involve me in something. Naturally, I am pleased by all of this interest in me, but—at the same time—I try with all my might to make sure I do not end up on the same chaotic merry-go-round I was on when I was president.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] After you resigned, some politicians compared you to a captain who was the first to abandon his sinking ship. Such criticism did not only come from opposition representatives; a similar view was also expressed by your friend Jan Sokol when he was toying with the idea of accepting a nomination for the federal presidency. What is your opinion of these views?

[Havel] The ship's crew made it abundantly clear to me that they did not want me as their captain, among other things, because I did not recommend that the ship be divided in two. They indicated that I was an obstacle to the fulfillment of their will. I simply did not want to be a three-month obstacle to irreversible development, an undesirable three-month glue for something that could not be glued together, and—consequently—a rather absurd figure. Moreover, I would not have served any purpose. Jan Sokol was not elected president; he was in a rather different position. Obviously, he felt that if parliament placed its trust in him, he would still be able to do something—not, perhaps, prevent the breakup, but at least guarantee its smooth course. I respect his optimism, but I do not share it. Of course, I am in favor of this course of action being conducted smoothly, but I am afraid a federal president is the last person who could provide such a guarantee. Even if he were to succeed in contributing to something like this, then—obviously—it would be at the cost of greatly discrediting the office of president. For example, imagine a president who swears a ceremonial oath of loyalty to Czechoslovakia in the Vladislav Hall and, at the same time, knows that in a couple of months he will be forced to sign a law on breaking up the Federation. I just feel that if we are doomed to break up, it would be better to do so without a federal head of state.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] Why, in that case, did you stand for the presidency at all?

[Havel] An aversion to me—as well as a more widespread aversion to the continuation of the office of federal president—had to be displayed so that at least one thing was made clear. If I had not stood for reelection, many people would have said that I contributed to the breakup because I had fled the battlefield out of fear of not being elected. If I had not stood for reelection, the claim about the captain who abandoned his sinking ship would have been absolutely correct.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] In comparison to many politicians, the public accepted your departure from Prague Castle quite calmly. For instance, in 1990 it seemed impossible to reject President Havel, who was simply irreplaceable; in 1992 we easily reconciled ourselves to the loss of our head of state. How do you explain this?

[Havel] There are more reasons. One of them was—obviously—the widespread impression that the Federation has no future and that my nonelection to a federal post is no great tragedy. The fact that many people did not unequivocally associate their hopes for democratic development with me could also have played a role here. Of course, this is quite appropriate: What kind of democracy would it be if it were to rise and fall with one man?

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] The Movement For a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS], which categorically opposed your nomination, made your continuation in office impossible. Its most senior representatives based their disagreement on the fact that the Castle, in the role of an eminence grise, participated in the fall of Vladimir Meciar in April 1990 and in his alleged surveillance by the Federal Security and Information Service. Could you clarify your role in these matters?

[Havel] I had nothing to do with Mr. Meciar's recall; on the contrary, I took great care to ensure I was not dragged into it. I considered this to be a purely Slovak matter and I knew that any involvement by me would only have dire political consequences. The claim that I had something to do with the alleged surveillance of Mr. Meciar is pure nonsense. Mr. Meciar is rather prone to seeing conspirators everywhere that want to ruin him. The fact that Mr. Carnogursky's method of government was more amenable to me than Mr. Meciar's is another matter. However, this was only my opinion; I never projected it into my political activity. I am also a democrat and the idea that I would exceed my authority and try by means of behind-the-scenes intrigues to influence the decision-making of democratic institutions is alien to me.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] Vladimir Meciar also declared that you gave clear support to his political opponents in a preelection speech. Virtually the entire Czech and Slovak left wing interpreted your speech as a violation of your proclaimed impartiality. With the benefit of hindsight, how do you now view this speech?

[Havel] The reasons why Mr. Meciar and the HZDS did not want me to be elected president are more profound and more complicated; the aforementioned speech was not the main reason, of course. In this speech, I warned the voters against those who make empty promises, who change their opinions, and who put forward various daring, confused, and controversial plans for our future statehood. The fact that Mr. Meciar applied it to himself is his business. Obviously, the voters did not apply it to him, because they voted for him. I did not want to drum up support for any specific party in the election campaign; I also did not want to speak out against any party. I merely wanted to defend certain values. I think this was my duty. Not doing so would have meant being a president without an opinion. However, what would such a president be good for?

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] On the other hand, many opposition politicians vehemently insist on holding a referendum on the constitutional and legal situation, something you pushed long and hard for. In your opinion, would holding a referendum in the current situation make any sense?

[Havel] A referendum would have made sense a year ago when I so vehemently campaigned for it. Today it seems to me to be too late for a referendum. Who could hold a referendum today, where would he hold it, and what would it be about? Following the approval of the Slovak Constitution, the HZDS will not accede to any referendum in Slovakia other than a ratification referendum which would merely confirm what Slovak political representatives have already done. I cannot imagine that anyone anywhere could force the Slovak National Council or the Slovak part of the Federal Assembly to agree to anything else. What would the Czechs decide upon in a referendum? Either they would say they want to preserve the common state—which cannot be preserved, because the democratically elected Slovak representatives do not want it—or, they would say they want division, which is what they are going to get anyway. That is, they would choose between an impossible dream and an irreversible fact. I do not know what sense such a referendum would make.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] In this connection, how do you perceive the adoption of the Slovak Republic Constitution? Do you perceive the establishment of an independent state in it?

[Havel] This is the constitution of an independent state. Some articles come into effect at a later date, but its very existence augurs future independence. Moreover, independence is materialized directly and instantaneously in some of the Slovak Constitution's articles. These are the articles at variance with the Federal Constitution, which are effective immediately. From a purely legal point of view, it would be possible to view the adoption of this constitution as an anticonstitutional withdrawal from the Federation. However, I do not think there is any point in looking at the Slovak Constitution from this

point of view. Czechoslovakia also did not evolve "constitutionally"; in fact, no new state evolves in a purely constitutional manner, because states' constitutions do not normally contain articles that would make their breakup possible and—moreover—would make it possible in a manner advantageous to the part seeking independence (if, of course, I do not count totalitarian constitutions: Stalin's constitution allowed for the possibility of a republic's secession from the USSR, because totalitarian constitutions, being only a piece of paper, could allow for any possibility). It was clear before the Slovak Constitution was adopted that we are heading toward division into two states; the constitution merely confirmed this. It is in the two republics' vital interest that this division proceeds calmly on the principle of agreement, that the two new states are successor states, and that their future coexistence is not burdened by hostility, mutual recrimination, and various conflicts. Slovakia has a right to independence; Czechs must accept its independence and an agreement has to be reached with Slovakia on making sure everything is done decently. Mixing legal considerations on the nonconstitutional nature of the Slovak Constitution into all of this seems rather politically naive to me. It is difficult to perfectly implement the right to self-determination anywhere. On the other hand, of course, I have to say that the Slovaks would improve their situation considerably if they were just a little more patient and postponed bringing their entire constitution into effect until the Federation is officially terminated. If I remember correctly, I advised them to do this. However, as you know, advice from a Czech—moreover, from a Czech who has campaigned so hard for the Federation—is a priori suspect in Slovakia.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] "Partition would be a denial of the will of whole generations.... If we were to part ways today, future generations would see this as a mistake and would not forgive us for it" is what you wrote a year ago in your Summer Reflections. Are you not worried about condemnation by future generations?

[Havel] I personally do not have to fear this condemnation, because I was not in favor of partition. The future will reveal how future generations view it. Although I know partition is unavoidable, I still believe future generations will not consider it to be a good thing. If they do not consider it to be a good thing, all the better.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] When you were interviewed on television by Antonin Pridal, you used the phrase "the Czech state's spiritual level." Do you think that under the conditions of today's moral crisis and of the ignorance in our post-communist society it is at all possible to give the Czech state a spiritual footing?

[Havel] A moral crisis and ignorance do not invite respect or consideration, but, on the contrary, they represent a challenge that has to be confronted.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] Yes, you are right, but throughout this state's history Czech narrow-mindedness and lack of inspiration have always prevailed after a brief period of resistance (let us recall the weeks prior to Munich or the week after the occupation in August 1968). Is this not our national fate?

[Havel] Certainly, this degeneration into misgivings after moments of social defiance is also part of our tradition. However, it is necessary to confront this and invoke again and again lasting and creative civic work. It is not by chance that the idea of "a small contribution" was also Masaryk's leitmotif.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] In your opinion, who or which social groups should—first and foremost—take on the task of raising the nation's spiritual level?

[Havel] The role of scientists, pedagogues, the clergy, and educators in general is so obvious that it is almost banal to talk about it. One of the dangers of democracy—including ours—is the fact that average people who cannot see further than the tip of their own noses are often involved in politics.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] In your opinion, the future Czech state should establish a new political system that would prevent hypertrophy, or even a party dictatorship. In this context, you often quote Ferdinand Peroutka who referred to parties as the misfortune of our political system. However, Peroutka also conceded that it was only thanks to Czechoslovakia's highly developed party system that it survived the anti-democratic whirlwind of the 1920's. Are we not in a similar situation today?

[Havel] Today's Czechoslovakia is different. The type of whirlwind that threatened the country in the 1920's does not threaten us now. The world is different, and I am really deeply convinced that we have an opportunity to learn from all our own experiences and from all the experiences of other states and create our political system a little better. Constituting an independent state provides a golden opportunity for this. I fully understand those economists who do not want a third way combining socialism with capitalism; they do not want to establish a utopia and experiment too much. Nevertheless, it does not seem appropriate to me to form a view of the world from this principle and stop trying to improve something or create something new. The history of mankind is a history of human creativity, inventiveness, the discovery of new things, and the formation of new ideas—stopping something like this would mean challenging the very substance of human life.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] Are you trying to say that the situation in the Czech lands is such that certain influential parties would—or have a tendency to—suppress something or stop people from doing something?

[Havel] I would not say that the Czech political parties have suppressive or prohibitive tendencies. They are

more inclined—by repeating certain phraseological stereotypes—to create an atmosphere of mild pressure and a situation in which it is simply not suitable to say certain things. Today, for example, it is an absolute faux pas to speak in polite company about “seeking,” “discovering,” or “new solutions.”

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] Reports are circulating that emissaries from certain parties—from the Civic Democratic Alliance in particular, but also from other parties—are trying to persuade you to join their ranks. Does it make any practical sense to continue the First Republic tradition of having an impartial president?

[Havel] Undoubtedly, there will be party presidents in our country, or at least presidents that, to a certain extent, belong to a political party. If, let us say in the year 2010, some sixty-year-old is elected president, then he should not be someone who is politically “tabula rasa,” some university professor who has never been interested in politics. Such a person could really only be a decorative and representative president. He will be—and should be—a person who has been politically active since his twenties. It is difficult to imagine as president a person who has not grown up and made his mark in a specific political environment, that is, within a party.

At the moment, however, when the political scene is still evolving, when it still lacks sufficient traditions, and when our political life is so polarized, it seems to me that we cannot run the risk of a purely party president. This would probably only lead to further undesirable polarization. It seems to me that we still need an integrating president capable of guaranteeing—in this politically stormy period—a certain state and political continuity—that is, a president not identified too much with any specific political party. This is a general consideration. As far as I am personally concerned, I do not feel the need to join any party or to found one, and I do not even think that such a step would be of more general benefit. On the contrary, it would further dramatize our already dramatic political scene. Incidentally, I do not think that my not belonging to any political party would mean that I am a person completely without a political profile. The support expressed by some parties for me and the opposition of others adequately confirms this.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] The result of the recent elections on the Czech scene placed you in the role of a crucial partner for Vaclav Klaus. How do you, who places emphasis—first and foremost—on the moral and ethical side of politics, get on with a man who, apart from this principle, stresses phlegmatic pragmatism in politics?

[Havel] I think we complement each other rather well for this very reason.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] As we are discussing Vaclav Klaus, there was some press speculation in the summer of 1990 that the Castle tried to move the former CSFR finance minister to the politically less important post of State Bank governor. Was this speculation warranted?

[Havel] When the Civic Forum-Public Against Violence [OF-VPN] coalition government was formed, various combinations were considered. Everything possible, including nationality, was taken into consideration, and I remember that at one particular phase of the negotiations OF and VPN representatives indeed asked me to talk to Vaclav Klaus about the possibility of becoming State Bank governor. This was at a period when the task of the day was, among other things, to unshackle the bank from the state and place it on its own two independent feet, and some people thought that such a forceful figure as Vaclav Klaus would perform this task well. Of course, various other reasons played a role here. Neither the Castle nor pressure were involved. I simply discussed this issue with Vaclav Klaus (that is, I did not exert any pressure on him) and I discussed it with him with the authority of the political partners and not on behalf of the Castle. I feel, with the benefit of hindsight, that it was correct for Vaclav Klaus to remain finance minister and for Josef Tosovsky to remain governor of the State Bank. Various options are always discussed at coalition talks, many of which seem, with the passage of time, completely nonsensical.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] Let us return to the present. It is probably too premature to ask you if you would like to become president of the independent Czech state. However, can you tell us under what circumstances you would definitely not want to become Czech president?

[Havel] You have asked an astute question, congratulations. First and foremost, I would not want to be president if there was not a relatively broad political consensus in the matter of my presidency. I do not think I could fill this function properly if, for example, I were elected after ten rounds of voting and by only one vote and if many people elected me out of self-denial just because there has to be a president. Incidentally, it would not augur well for the new state if it started by not being able to elect a president—this situation is more appropriate for states that are breaking up. I also would not want to be a president if I were unable—according to the constitution—to carry out creative work and were merely condemned to wearing a tie from morning till evening, laying wreaths on memorials, making ceremonial speeches during anniversaries, and attending countless lunches and dinners at which I could only talk to the honored guests about the weather. Some people would certainly be glad to have such a life, but my character is a little different. It is more important for me to be able to do something creative according to my own intellect and conscience. I could not stand to mechanically carry out someone else's instructions for very long.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] Now for our last question: You have mysteriously indicated several times that you have a “plan.” Is it not time to lift the veil of secrecy and reveal its details and aims?

[Havel] I have not indicated this several times, but just once. I did not indicate it mysteriously, but quite normally. This is a quotation from Benes' memoirs that I

borrowed for myself when I was 11 years old so I could use it jokingly in all possible and impossible circumstances. (I have more borrowed sayings). If I had realized during my Conversations From Lany—when it, more or less, just slipped out—what it would lead to, I would not have said it. It was my stupidity. After all, I was not talking to my wife or my friend Zdenek Urbanek who know my silly sayings from time immemorial, but to millions of people who do not know them.

The impression was given that I have a secret plan to save the Republic and the world, something like a miraculous weapon with which it is possible to win any war. Reporters have been writing about my plan since then and have been asking me about it and I have been in despair over it. However, all of this indicates that we are going through a stage of general uncertainty and is, naturally, fertile ground for the search for miraculous solutions that will resolve everything all at once. Of course, I have my plans just like everyone else. However, they are neither mysterious nor miraculous. When I mentioned that "I have my plan," I meant that I would resign on a specific date and then disappear from public life for a certain period in order to rest, study and think about a few things and then, at a specific moment and in a specific manner, return to public and political life. I have done all of this. Naturally, I have more specific ideas about how we should proceed in our country, how we should divide the current state, how we should found a new state, and how we should coexist with the Slovak Republic. I have ideas about the Czech constitution, about the Czech Republic's policy, and about many other things. I also know how to gradually acquaint the public and politicians with my ideas. Of course, there is something far more important than specific ideas about the contents of and timetable for various definite steps: A concept for a specific type of political culture from which these steps should develop, a concept for a method and style of political behavior that should accompany them, and a concept for the attitudes they should reflect. I have all of this—it would be a disgrace if I did not have any of this—but the issue, understandably, does not involve a secret and amazingly miraculous scheme for saving the world as may appear from the constant probing questions. To sum up: My "plan" is nothing other than a concept for the values I would like to continually emphasize, for the definite political ideas that evolve from these values, and for the method of evoking these values and ideas in my specific position.

Czech Minister Discusses Friction Within ODA

AU2909105692 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 25 Sep 92 p 6

[Interview with Vladimir Dlouhy, chairman of the Civic Democratic Alliance Political Board, by Jiri Leschtina; place and date not given: "A Secret Ballot Will Decide"]

[Text] Developments within Civic Democratic Alliance [ODA], which is an important part in the three-party coalition—with the Civic Democratic Party and the

Christian and Democratic Union- Czechoslovak People's Party—accelerated in anticipation of tomorrow's ODA conference. We therefore asked Vladimir Dlouhy, chairman of the ODA Political Board, one of the protagonists of the conflict, the following questions:

[Leschtina] Is the contest between yourself, on the one side, and the [ODA] deputy chairmen Pavel Bratinka and Daniel Kroupa, on the other, really vital and insurmountable?

[Dlouhy] These are unreasonably strong words. The public and, above all, reporters should slowly get used to polemics—they are a commonplace in a democratic party. The debate about the political foundations of the ODA and its future orientation has been augmented by the outcome of the elections, which I certainly do not consider to be a success. Hence, it is not a split but rather a coming to terms with the election results. This process should include measures to consolidate the organization of the party, and changes to improve the image of the ODA.

[Leschtina] Do you have certain individuals in mind who should leave the highest echelons of the ODA?

[Dlouhy] It is worth considering, for instance, whether in the future the current five-member leadership should not be reduced to three. There should be some kind of a "general secretary" among them who is a full-time employee of the ODA, and who is responsible for the party's organizational apparatus. Nevertheless, changes in personnel or the statutes cannot be a result of personal wishes, but only of a democratic secret vote at our conference. We are currently experiencing a situation familiar in other political parties founded, above all, on friendships. The ODA has often publicly proclaimed that it is an intelligent party with continuous discussion and a constant exchange of opinions. On the other hand, the friendships prevent stricter party discipline. It is time to say what the abilities of each of us are, what we simply cannot do, and in what positions we can make the best contribution to the ODA.

[Leschtina] Does that mean you would like to see the ODA as a traditional mass party in all its aspects?

[Dlouhy] First of all, the ODA must become an organized party with a professional apparatus and clearly defined relations in the leadership. We do not have to be a mass party, but the membership must be increased so that we are represented not only in all cities but also in smaller communities—everywhere, where the outcome of the local and parliamentary elections is decided.

[Leschtina] According to some reports, you want to transform the right-wing and conservative ODA into a liberal party leaning toward the political center.

[Dlouhy] Neither I, nor anybody else among the ODA representatives has ever talked about an inclination toward the center of the spectrum. It has nothing to do with a shift to the left or a departure from the principles

to which the ODA, as a right-wing party, has subscribed. It is, above all, a return to the authentic values of conservatism (this brings the party close to the traditional liberals), to the activity of the individual, a reduction of the role of the state—and not only in the economy, but also in legislation, the territorial arrangement, and other spheres.

[Leschtina] This program does not differ from the conservative program of the Civic Democratic Party, which dominates the right-wing of the political spectrum. Does another right-wing party have a chance of survival next to the broadly-based and well-organized Civic Democratic Party?

[Dlouhy] I can imagine that it will be difficult for the Civic Democratic Party, which controls most of the institutions of power, to defend itself against a certain degree of centralism. It is here that an exclusive political space opens up for the ODA, which should shape up as a modern right-wing party that seeks true decentralization and continuing cutbacks in the state apparatus.

[Leschtina] Do you believe that the voters will be able at all to discern the fine nuances between you and the ODS?

[Dlouhy] As long as these nuances—as you call it—can be seen in specific practices and activities of the ODA, the answer is yes, eventually. I believe that the ODA has a chance to address a certain part of farmers, businessmen, and other groups interested in the state being very serious about the reduction of its role. Nonetheless, you are right: If we want to have a strong position as a party of the democratic right, we must, in the long run, above all, create clear stands in specific areas which the people understand—low taxes, small ministries, decentralization of administrative power, more independence in decisionmaking on budget funds, true support for private businessmen, etc. That brings me to the demand that a discussion be opened on a broader program and political basis of our entire work. This is not a shift to the center or to the left but rather a step forwards.

[Leschtina] Some of your party adversaries hint that you personally would not oppose a future merger between the ODA and the Civic Democratic Party. Would you care to comment?

[Dlouhy] I am convinced that the ODA must exist as an independent political party. This assumes, however, that first of all it is transformed into a strong entity that has better election chances than last June.

[Leschtina] Are you not worried that the present conflicts within the ODA might result in a split?

[Dlouhy] Nothing like that has ever been my goal.

Chairman Rejects 'Possible Disintegration' of ODA

AU2909192492 Prague CSTK in English 1902 GMT
26 Sep 92

[Text] Prague Sept 26 (CSTK)—Jan Kalvoda, chairman of the Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA), today rejected considerations about the ODA's possible disintegration or differences of views as reported by the press.

Speaking at the 5th national conference, Kalvoda said that important for the ODA's future are constructive changes that would lead to a greater efficiency of the policy of the party which undoubtedly has a big potential, he stressed.

Established in December 1989, the ODA now has 14 seats in the 200-seat Czech National Council (Parliament).

Kalvoda said the division of Czechoslovakia, which he considers as irrevocable, will probably be accompanied by difficulties and crises as some political steps by the Slovak republic in international relations indicate.

He especially mentioned Slovak Premier Vladimir Meciar's statement on Friday [25 September] that as soon as Slovakia becomes independent January 1, 1993, it will seek a new treaty with Germany, to replace that signed by Czechoslovakia and Germany in February 1992.

Sladek To Represent CSFR in European Parliament

AU2909192692 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 25 Sep 92 pp 1, 2

["ha, jop"-signed report: "The Bill on the Manner of Termination Will Be Discussed After All"]

[Excerpts] The Government coalition succeeded in having the government-sponsored bill on the manner of terminating the federation included on the agenda of the fourth joint meeting of Federal Assembly chambers. The amendment to the constitutional law on the referendum was not included on the agenda. [passage omitted]

The program of the fourth meeting of the Federal Assembly is finally known, after a discussion that lasted several hours. The dispute over how to include on the agenda and discuss constitutional bills enabling the federation's breakup was resolved by the chambers in favor of the government coalition. The opposition's proposal that the bill on the division of the federation's property and the amendment to the law on the referendum be discussed first was not passed. Parliament will discuss the government-sponsored bill on the manner of termination of the federation next week. The Federal Assembly chambers also rejected a proposal by Josef Krejsa (the Association for the Republic-Republican Party of Czechoslovakia) to start a debate on holding a referendum.

During yesterday's meeting, the Federal Assembly approved without any extensive debate the Law on Applied Patterns [Zakon o uzitnych vzorech] and an amendment to the Law on the State Testing System. The first piece of legislation introduces an independent subject of industrial ownership—the applied pattern—which facilitates entry into the state register. The applied pattern has an effect similar to that of a patent, but its granting is less time-consuming and less costly. The second piece of legislation liberalizes the conditions of authorization for the execution of state testing, such as the licensing and distribution of imported products. [passage omitted] Although the amendment to the current law does not establish a testing system fully compatible with that of the EC, it eliminates a number of obstacles to international trade and comes close to the European standard.

Deputies of the two Federal Assembly chambers also approved the abrogation of the CEMA General Conditions for Deliveries and the General Conditions for Specialization and Cooperation in Production, two lingering legal anachronisms.

The People's Chamber and the Chamber of Nations approved an eight member Federal Assembly delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and a 15-member CSFR delegation to the European Parliament. One of its members is Miroslav Sladek, chairman of the Association for the Republic-Republican Party of Czechoslovakia, in defiance of serious objections to his person voiced during the parliamentary debate. [passage omitted]

Czech, Slovak Cabinets To Discuss Relations

AU2909103092 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 25 Sep 92 p 1

[Marta Ruzickova, CSTK report: "Governments of the Republics Will Meet at Zidlochovice on 6 October; Meciar Favors Agreement Between the National Councils"]

[Excerpt] Nuremberg—The Slovak and Czech Governments will hold a joint meeting at Zidlochovice on 6 October, Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar told journalists after yesterday's working lunch of participants in the Nuremberg conference of the Danube Region Working Association. Meciar announced that proposals for a customs unions and a common market and the likely development in the monetary sphere will be the most important items on the agenda of talks between the two governments.

"We will start with a common currency, until national currencies are prepared and the transition to a one-to-one exchange rate between them is made. The state of the economy, the development of the budgets, and the value of the koruna are going to be reassessed within a certain time frame and, should it not work out, the exchange rate will be changed," said Meciar in reply to a question about his idea of future monetary development.

According to Vladimir Meciar, an agreement between the two national councils would be the best manner of terminating the federation's existence. In Slovakia, this agreement would then be confirmed by citizens in a referendum. He assumes that the agreement could be prepared by the end of October and signed in November. [passage omitted]

Finance Minister Reviews Visit to U.S.

AU2909192192 Prague CSTK in English 1907 GMT 26 Sep 92

[Text] Prague Sept 26 (CSTK)—Czechoslovak Finance Minister Jan Klak today said that Czechoslovakia's International Monetary Fund (IMF) could be divided in the 2-1 proportion, but added that the final decision will be made by the IMF whose commission will soon visit Czechoslovakia.

On his return home from a visit to the IMF and the World Bank in Washington, said that everything will depend on whether the breakup of Czechoslovakia is peaceful.

If this is ensured, he said, the IMF and the World Bank will do everything for Czechoslovakia's membership to be transferred to the successor states smoothly and without interruption.

Klak said that Czechoslovakia's deposit with the IMF is about 1,000 million dollars which is tantamount to 0.6 per cent of the voting right. Currently, Czechoslovakia has a loan from the IMF worth almost 1,000 million dollars and destines for stabilization of its currency. The amount is part of Czechoslovakia's foreign exchange reserves, Klak said.

He also told journalists that the international finance corporation (IFC), which invests into the private sector, wants together with other foreign investors to invest 1,400 million Deutsche mark into the Czechoslovak-German Skoda-Siemens car makers joint venture.

In Washington Klak also signed two agreements to develop cooperation with the multilateral investment guarantee agency (MIGA) which is the World Bank's affiliate.

Klak told journalists that he and his Byelorussian and Kazakh counterparts agreed that these two countries should soon conclude with Czechoslovak agreements on support and protection of investment and prevention of double taxation.

New CSTK Director Interviewed on Situation

AU2909145692 Prague METROPOLITNI TELEGRAF in Czech 26 Sep 92 p 3

[Interview with CSTK Director Tomas Kopriva by Ota Veverka; place and date not given: "I Hope They Will Leave Of Their Own Volition"]

[Excerpts] Federal Assembly Deputy Tomas Kopriva (Civic Democratic Party) took over as CSTK director last week. [passage omitted]

[Veverka] What specific shortcomings have you come across in CSTK?

[Kopriva] CSTK is contending with the problems faced by every enterprise. A widespread problem is the fact that people who used to think in the dimensions of a socialist economy now have to reorient themselves toward a market economy. Some of them are fully capable of this, but the transformation process is very painful for others. In comparison to other agencies, CSTK is at a disadvantage in the sense that it is linked to the state budget. However, this link has its pros and cons.

[Veverka] In view of the fact that you mentioned people who are finding it difficult to cope with orienting themselves toward a market economy, will any personnel changes be necessary?

[Kopriva] I have said several times that there will be no earthquakes within CSTK. Of course, personnel changes will take place in the normal fashion. I expect that people who fundamentally disagree with the agency's delimitation and with its new organizational arrangement within the Czech Republic will leave the agency of their own volition. However, I have to say that, so far, I have only

come across people who want to conduct delimitation and the transfer to a new organization as quickly as possible.

[Veverka] The former director, Petr Uhl, submitted several complaints against various people on behalf of CSTK. Do you intend to go through with them?

[Kopriva] So far, I have only familiarized myself briefly with them. It seems to me at first glance that CSTK was not harmed very much by the statements made by the people and newspapers against whom these complaints have been submitted and it seems unnecessary to seek legal protection. In view of the fact that there is no danger of delaying proceedings in the next few weeks, I would like to study all the material very carefully and consult our lawyers on how far to proceed. At the moment, any categorical conclusions would—to say the least—be premature.

[Veverka] Petr Uhl is still a CSTK employee. What is he doing now?

[Kopriva] He is a correspondent in the section dealing with court and prosecutor's office issues.

[Veverka] Do you think he is up to this job?

[Kopriva] I would not be very happy if someone assessed my work after one week. Therefore, I will not do this to Petr Uhl.

Article Claims Soviets Could Not Invade in 1981

AU2909213592 Warsaw NOWY SWIAT in Polish 23 Sep 92 p 4

[PAP report: "Was Soviet Intervention Possible?"]

[Text] "The cost of Soviet military intervention in 1981 would have been beyond the USSR's capabilities at the time. Rumors about the possibility of Soviet intervention were spread deliberately in order to pressure various political circles in Poland," says Edmund Jodkowski in the September issue of LITERATURNIYE NOVOSTI.

"The cynical calculations of members of the Soviet General Staff, who had decided to frighten the Poles with the threat of occupation, had a fundamental effect on the course of events," says Jodkowski. One should not give undue praise to General Jaruzelski's attitude, he adds. The decision not to apply the Czechoslovak option toward Poland was made at a meeting of the CPSU Politburo. "The Politburo rejected this variant by six votes to five," says Jodkowski. "The sixth vote is believed to have been Brezhnev's."

"The development of events in Poland constituted no immediate threat to Soviet military transport through Poland," continues Jodkowski. "The costs of a Soviet intervention would have been too high and would have been beyond the means of the Soviet Union, which was already engaged in the war in Afghanistan. Occupying a country of 35 million people traditionally hostile to Moscow would have required the permanent presence of over one million soldiers and hundreds of thousands of KGB agents."

Jodkowski says that one reason that the idea of armed intervention was abandoned was the fear of the character of the Poles who, unlike the Czechs, do not take punishment lightly and would never accept intervention. "Fraternal assistance would have caused a merciless fratricidal civil war," he says.

"One must be mentally ill to consider martial law as a panacea for all ills, yet that is exactly what the representatives of the Polish nationalist right wing think. Poland's example shows that martial law does not solve any problems. It merely prolongs a certain status quo and enmeshes the country in a quagmire," Jodkowski calls for faster proceedings against the authors of the putsch, which will make it possible "clearly to separate lies from truth and totalitarianism from democracy."

Politicians Discuss Views on Martial Law Inquiry

AU2909101992 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 26-27 Sep 92 pp 1, 2

[By Aleksandra Fanderejewska and Ewa Kaszuba: "If I Were a Prosecutor"]

[Text] "At 1400 on 12 December 1981, General Jaruzelski, in concert with Generals Kiszczak and Siwicki, issued the unlawful decision to introduce martial law,

and thus set in motion a police action that deprived several thousand people of their freedom," said Leszek Moczulski, leader of the Confederation of Independent Poland [KPN]. "At the same time, it was declared that power over the state was henceforth in the hands of an unconstitutional body known as the Military Council for National Salvation. These facts constitute a clear violation of Article 123 of the criminal code, dealing with violations of the constitutional order, in other words a coup d'etat. We charge the members of the highest authorities at the time, in other words ministers and members of the then State Council, with violating this article. Unfortunately, the KPN has not been able to bring the authors of martial law before the prosecutor's office, to which a considerably larger number of people, several hundred, should answer, but at least a start has been made."

It has already been reported that on Tuesday, 22 September, the Sejm Commission of Constitutional Responsibility met to examine a motion from the KPN parliamentary club to make the authors of martial law face constitutional and criminal responsibility. General Jaruzelski, who attended that meeting, said that a judgment about martial law had already been passed at the Sejm debate in February this year. He also reiterated that he bore sole responsibility for the introduction of martial law.

"This was a criminal plot, and the leader of a criminal plot cannot take upon himself the responsibility of his accomplices," said Moczulski. "The fact that Jaruzelski made the decision does not absolve Kiszczak, who ordered the arrest of many people, and it does not absolve lower-ranking people, who issued orders to shoot. Everyone bears individual responsibility here, and they must answer for it."

Many politicians agree that there is no doubt that those who introduced martial law violated Polish legislation, but the question of political responsibility for the December 1981 decision is a subject for discussion.

In the opinion of Andrzej Potocki (Democratic Union), martial law was an anti-Polish action that caused harm to the state and society, and marked the beginning of ten years of stagnation in which the authority of the communist nomenklatura was reestablished. These are serious political crimes, therefore its perpetrators should also face political responsibility. Bogdan Borusewicz (Solidarity) added that those responsible for martial law should answer for it not just because of the past, but because of the future, so that no one ever again has the same idea General Jaruzelski had. "Therefore a proper trial is the only fitting finale to this business," he said.

Jacek Merkel (Liberal-Democratic Congress) said no one is above judgment, not even politicians. "They should face constitutional responsibility," he said. "However, I am not a judge, and I am not going to pass sentences."

Ryszard Bugaj wondered if documentary evidence would be sufficient to establish the extent of the external

danger in 1981. The authors of martial law should be given a fair trial after an examination of all the circumstances, he said. "They should not be punished for purely political deeds. They should be punished for criminal actions and for those that caused specific harm to people. Jaroslaw Kaczynski (Center Accord) said that concrete evidence should be presented indicating that an alternative course of action to martial law could have been taken in 1981, a course of action overlooked by the authors of martial law. "If I were a prosecutor, I would press for the highest penalties," he said.

From a legal point of view, it does not make much difference whether General Jaruzelski assumes sole responsibility for martial law or not. Everyone in the State Council who signed the decree shares this responsibility. But it does make a difference when it comes to the degree of punishment.

Regardless of all the other aspects of the issue, the fact that Jaruzelski is willing to assume sole responsibility for martial law instead of passing the blame onto others shows his integrity. But in fact, the responsibility for martial law is collective. Jaruzelski did not occupy the kind of position in which he could have issued such a decision on his own, unless of course the decision was dictated from outside, and there are many indications that it was. Aleksander Kwasniewski (Alliance of the Democratic Left) said that only history can pass sentence on a political decision. No tribunal is capable of doing so, he maintains.

"If the case does go before the State Tribunal, it will take a very long time to deal with because many documents will have to be perused and many witnesses examined," Kwasniewski says. "If anyone expects spectacular results, he will be disappointed. The State Tribunal is not to be confused with a revolutionary tribunal."

Kwasniewski described General Jaruzelski's attitude as befitting someone who does not shirk responsibility and is aware of the circumstances in which he made his decision. From a political point of view, this is an honest thing to do.

Wojciech Olszowski (Polish Peasant Party) described Jaruzelski's attitude as misleading. Jaruzelski may have had the final say on this matter, but he was not acting in a political vacuum. There are entire groups of people responsible for what happened in Poland at the time.

Andrzej Potocki admitted that Jaruzelski's conduct was noble, but said that Jaruzelski is not empowered to take the blame on himself. "The decision was made by a body of people, and they should also be made to answer for it," he said. He disagreed that the Sejm debate had passed a verdict. Only an institution specially convened for this purpose, in other words a court, can do so, he said.

Tadeusz Zielinski, civic ombudsman, said he would make no comment until the Constitutional Commission has all the documents at its disposal.

Andrzej Drzycimski, the president's press spokesman, said "one must realize that martial law caused society to lose the hope that was born in 1980. We can feel this loss keenly today. It is a great and irretrievable loss for our society, for which the authors of martial law are accountable. The matter is now in the hands of the Sejm, which will examine it on two levels, a moral level and a political level. The president has said many times that there is still not enough data to provide a full assessment of martial law. History will make a fuller assessment, but without emotion."

Shortcomings in Immigration Policy Examined

AU2909154092 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA
(*'Law Every Day'* supplement) in Polish 23 Sep 92 p 1

[Marek Domagalski article: "An Eldorado For Immigrants"]

[Text] A citizen of Senegal was recently expelled from Poland after a stay of 16 years. Throughout this time he kept "losing" his passport and played peek-a-boo with the authorities.

Over 25 million foreign citizens have visited Poland this year alone, only 15,000 of whom required visas. Some of them stayed in Poland longer than they had planned, and some decided to stay for good. No one knows exactly how many have decided to stay because not everyone tells the authorities that he wishes to remain in Poland, and those who receive an order to leave the country do not always comply. Other foreign citizens sneak into Poland without being checked. For some of them, Poland is merely the threshold of the West of their dreams, but more and more foreigners are choosing Poland as their new home.

Even though it has been amended many times, the March 1963 law on aliens still displays glaring shortcomings concerning the issue and extension of visas and residence permits, and the treatment of aliens, especially when they break the law.

Fewer and fewer visas are being issued. The Border Guard says that about 15,000 visas were issued between January and the end of August this year, whereas 40,000 were issued during the same period last year. The reason, of course, is that most European countries no longer require visas. Those that still do, i.e. Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and Greece, will probably abolish such requirements soon. Agreements to this effect are almost complete.

But the question of visitors from Africa and Asia, and especially from the Middle East, is rather different. Colonel J. Klimowicz from Border Guard headquarters claims that most visitors from the Middle East, as well as Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, and the former Soviet

Union, extend their stay in Poland and fall foul of the law. It is mostly they who cross our borders illegally.

It is relatively easy to enter Poland. As a result, those wishing to extend their visa-free period in Poland that is normally three months, sometimes cause problems. They can apply for an extension of their visas, if they required one in the first place, or for a temporary residence permit that may be granted for a period of normally not more than two years. After that they can apply for a permanent residence permit that can also be applied for immediately upon entering Poland. Residence permits are very much in demand. Piotr Szczypinski, departmental director in the Interior Ministry, says that 25,000 permanent residence permits have already been issued, most of them within the past few months. Half of them were granted to citizens of the former Soviet Union. Foreigners tend to settle in the large conurbations.

A permanent residence permit is issued by the voivod on the recommendation of the chief of the voivodship police. But the law lays down no criteria for issuing or withdrawing them. Colonel Klimowicz says there is no coordination on these matters, especially between the Border Guard and the voivodship authorities responsible for aliens. These authorities do not even have a standard type of stamp for stamping foreign passports. Each voivodship authority makes different types of entries and annotations in passports, making it easy to forge, and difficult to detect forgeries when they occur. Neither is there proper cooperation concerning the issue of visas. A Polish consulate abroad might give an undesirable foreigner a visa valid for two or three days if that person has to visit Poland for urgent personal reasons, and then a voivodship authority might extend that visa

for another two months. Cooperation between the Border Guard and consulates is better, but there is no question of the Border Guard or any other institution having representatives inside the largest Polish diplomatic missions, as is the case with other countries.

Uniform procedures for various administrative and consular services are required, as well as new rules that suit the new reality, communications equipment, and computers. Fortunately, the Border Guard is in the process of being computerized. New Border Guard divisions are being formed, especially along the eastern border, which has been particularly neglected.

The most important matter, however, is a single aliens office dealing with all matters concerning foreigners, as is the case with, for example, France and England, where such officers handle matters concerning aliens, and issue visas and residence permits. In Poland, these documents are issued by the voivodes, for whom this is just a fringe activity. Officials often make the wrong decisions. For example, instead of giving businessmen multiple-entry visas valid for one or two years, they issue them with permanent residence permits. Another fault is the issue of work permits during a period of high unemployment, and by offices low down in the administrative hierarchy. In such a situation, there is really no such thing as a Polish "immigration policy," something that every country should have.

In addition, the execution of decisions by the "immigration authorities" is dubious. For instance, orders to leave the country remain mere pieces of paper. A foreigner has to get into real trouble in order to be expelled from Poland, like the above citizen of Senegal, who was finally thrown out after having lived for 16 years in Katowice.

NATO Military Delegation Arrives for Debates

AU2909210092 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1900 GMT 29 Sep 92

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 29/9/92—Following an invitation by Romania's Ministry of National Defence, a delegation of experts of the NATO international military staff, headed by General Amedeo Sturchio, has arrived for a session of debates with Romanian generals and commissioned officers over 28 September-2 October, about structural modernization of military bodies.

The roundtable started Tuesday, 29 September, when NATO and Romanian military experts presented to their audience the aim and statute of military restructuring within NATO, the purpose and scope of action of the restructuring process of Romania's Armed Forces. The talks are part of NATO's cooperation schedule with its partners over the period March-December 1992, agreed upon by foreign and defense ministers last spring in Brussels.

The NATO delegation will meet with the Romanian minister of national defense and the chief of staff, will visit a mobile unit, a military technical exhibition and places of general interest in Bucharest.

Observers Note 'Significant Step' Toward Democracy

AU2909210292 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1856 GMT 29 Sep 92

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 19/9/1992—The international observer delegation sent by the International Republican Institute (IRI) and the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) offered a preliminary statement on the September 27th presidential and parliamentary elections in Romania, released in Bucharest on September 29.

It shows that the national elections represent a significant step in Romania's continuing transition to democracy. The delegation was generally impressed with the diligent and serious work of election officials, the active participation of political parties, and the valuable presence of Romanian "domestic" observers.

The statement highlights "the generally calm and orderly electoral process; the enhanced development of multi-party competition; the increased awareness of and tolerance for diverse political viewpoints, and the increased transparency in the organization and administration of election day procedures."

Despite such positive features, the elections were not without problems. Although the voting and counting were generally open and orderly, the delegation did observe some administrative shortcomings, procedural inconsistencies, and irregularities.

In closing, the delegation emphasizes that progress in the conduct of elections, while essential, is but one aspect of

the establishment of a democratic civil society. It is apparent that many challenges remain in this regard in Romania, including the creation of an effective parliament responsive to the citizenry, an independent judiciary, the free flow of information at all levels of society, and an abundance of active civic organizations.

Constantinescu Urges People To Vote in Run-Off

AU2909125292 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1100 GMT 29 Sep 92

[Text] This morning, at the headquarters of the 21 December Association and in the presence of numerous Romanian and foreign reporters, Mr. Emil Constantinescu, candidate for president on behalf of the Democratic Convention of Romania [CDR], who is going to participate in the presidential run-off, expressed thanks both to those who voted for him, and to those who did not vote for him because they understood the importance of this moment for our country's destiny.

Mr. Emil Constantinescu also called on those who did not cast their vote to reflect on the importance of this moment and to vote during the run-off. Mr. Emil Constantinescu also expressed appreciation to the Romanian press, which—in the election campaign, regardless of color or nuances—took a stand in favor of democracy.

Mr. Emil Constantinescu then read an appeal addressed to all democratic political forces in Romania. The appeal points out that the preliminary data of the elections bring to light a few facts, of which Mr. Emil Constantinescu primarily recalled the gap between what was projected and what happened at the polls. This proved, Mr. Emil Constantinescu emphasized, insufficient knowledge about the voting intentions of the electorate, something that was proven by the fact that more than one-third of the electorate voted differently from what the projections were.

This reflects both fear of change and an alarming trend toward the left in our political arena. The configuration of the new parliament, Mr. Emil Constantinescu stressed, will render difficult the normal operation of the legal process, the investiture of the government, and the preservation of the vote of confidence of the parliamentary majority.

The appeal draws attention to the possible regrouping of political forces that favor a small-step policy in the reform process. This will lead to stagnation or even regression at the economic and social level, and to a policy of our country's subservience to the East at the foreign policy level.

Drawing attention to the worsening of the crisis, the appeal emphasizes that the only hope for balance among the power bodies in the coming four years would be a president who respects democracy and who will act as guarantor of the principles of a state governed by law.

Stressing the importance of a second ballot in the presidential elections, Mr. Emil Constantinescu admitted that he is taking on a very difficult mission, but he expressed the conviction that the significance of this mission will be understood by the democratic political forces in Romania, our reporter Elena Perdichi, who was present at the news conference, informed us.

Nastase Outlines Possible FDSN Coalition

AU3009081292 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 2049
GMT 29 Sep 92

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 29/9/1992—The formation of a new executive is as important a test for our party as this autumn's elections, stated at a news conference Foreign Minister Adrian Nastase, who is a vice-president of the Democratic National Salvation Front (FDSN), on Tuesday, September 29.

FDSN is going to cooperate with the wide range of political forces in parliament including the Democratic Convention of Romania [CDR] and the National Salvation Front [FSN]. We hope to find a formula to show national unity all the while keeping FDSN's social democratic structure throughout negotiations, specified Mr. Nastase.

Mr. Nastase's appointment to the party's leadership was assessed to be compulsory as he is a good negotiator.

Asked whether the Greater Romania Party [PRM] and the Socialist Party of Labor [PSM] would participate in

governing, Mr. Nastase said: I shall try to give a government formula which should not create a handicap for Romania on an either internal or international plane. He did not exclude an alliance with the FSN, whoever its leader may be.

Stolojan Attends Talks on Privatization Process

AU2909144092 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1357
GMT 29 Sep 92

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 29/9/1992—"The Romanian economy is faced with an unfavourable situation at present owing to decentralization, which was applied without clarifying property relationships," said Theodor Stolojan, prime minister of Romania, during a meeting at Victory Palace on Tuesday, September 29, with the Administration Board of the State Property Fund and executives of the National Privatisation Agency and the National Institute for Economic Research.

At the end of the interview, Adrian Severin, president of the National Privatization Agency, made a brief statement to the press saying that the talks had centered on the need to step up the privatization process, a methodology being applied in this respect for the rapid sale of shares to employees and for a more rapid exchange of property certificates for shares from various companies. Adrian Severin showed that possibilities had been tackled of reconstituting property relationships between the state and commercial companies, with the state property fund performing the state's activity of shareholder and with ministries and the rest of the government dealing with problems related to the general administration of society.

Karadzic Terms U.S. Accusations 'Unfounded'*LD2909194292 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1832
GMT 29 Sep 92*

[Text] Belgrade, Sept 29 (TANJUG)—Leader of Bosnian Serbs Radovan Karadzic on Tuesday [29 September] rejected U.S. accusations that his forces slaughtered 3,000 Moslems near Brcko.

"The U.S. State Department is duped by unsubstantiated Moslem propaganda", Karadzic said in the statement he sent REUTER office in Belgrade.

Karadzic said the accusations were unfounded and challenged U.S. President George Bush to produce evidence of such allegations. Karadzic said that, in that case, he would immediately arrest the culprits and hand them over for trial by the international community.

U.S. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher on Monday said Washington had new witnesses confirming reports of the slaughter of around 3,000 Moslems in a Serb-run camp near Brcko, north-east Bosnia, in May and June this year.

Karadzic said that 200 Serbian civilians, victims of last week's massacre carried out by Moslem forces, were buried on Tuesday morning, without the State Department having batted an eyelid.

TANJUG's Paris correspondent reported that France has officially requested of the United Nations and the European Community open an investigation regarding the alleged massacre of 3,000 Moslems near Brcko.

French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas sent a letter to U.N. Secretary-General Butrus-Ghali and British Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd, calling for an immediate international investigation to find out if U.S. allegations are true.

Serbs Deny Existence of Concentration Camps*LD2909130492 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service
in Serbo-Croatian 1054 GMT 29 Sep 92*

[Text] Brcko, 29 Sep (TANJUG)—The leadership of the [Serb-held] Brcko municipality today vehemently denied claims by the U.S. Administration about concentration camps for Muslims in the town. At the same time, municipal officials have called on international organizations to send their representatives to the Muslim-held parts of Brcko municipality, where Muslim forces are holding captive about 1,500 women, children, and elderly people.

In its statement, Brcko authorities stress that all Muslims who have remained in the area under its control live normally and continue to work in all of the town's institutions: banks, shops, and hospitals.

The leaders of Brcko municipality again invite representatives of relevant international commissions to visit the

municipality and see for themselves that no camps for Muslims are to be found there.

Izetbegovic Agrees to Demilitarization Talks*LD2909172392 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1623
GMT 29 Sep 92*

[Text] Geneva, Sept 29 (TANJUG)—Bosnian Moslem leader Alija Izetbegovic on Tuesday [29 September] said he agreed to the demilitarization of Sarajevo.

Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic has already supported the idea, forwarded by international mediators at the Geneva negotiations on the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in which a civil and ethnic war has raged for nearly six months now.

Izetbegovic said he and co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Yugoslavia Cyrus Vance and David Owen agreed on opening talks to demilitarize Sarajevo, as the first step towards a cease-fire in Bosnia-Herzegovina, ASSOCIATED PRESS reported.

After his meeting with Vance and Owen, Izetbegovic said that UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] commander in Sarajevo Philippe Morillon was discussing the idea on demilitarization of Sarajevo with Karadzic. "I believe that a political agreement on that already exists and that now both the Moslem and Serbian sides are only to agree on effecting the demilitarization of Sarajevo", Izetbegovic said.

Izetbegovic said that the Sarajevo plan envisaged the setting up of a north and a south corridors, which would enable access to and from the city. If the demilitarization of Sarajevo succeeds, then the same formula will be applied to other hotbeds in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Izetbegovic said on Monday evening he did "not expect much of the Geneva talks". He said that to Turkish journalists at Ankara airport, where he stopped on his way back from Islamabad. In Islamabad, Izetbegovic asked for Pakistan's and other Islamic countries' support, including weapons and manpower.

This, however, did not stop him on Tuesday from denying allegations that Middle East volunteers were fighting alongside his troops in Bosnia.

"We have many boys ready to fight. Bosnia-Herzegovina could have an army of 100,000 soldiers if it were able to arm them. We do not need any foreign boys", Izetbegovic said.

Izetbegovic will leave Geneva on Tuesday evening and will not attend the talks between Yugoslav President Dobrica Cosic and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman there on Wednesday. It is believed that he will stop over in Zagreb on Tuesday evening on his way back to Sarajevo for a talk with Tudjman.

Karadzic Rejects Cease-Fire Proposed by Muslims

LD2909212492 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2019 GMT 29 Sep 92

[Text] Belgrade, 29 Sep (TANJUG)—President of the Serbian Republic Radovan Karadzic left Belgrade tonight for Geneva where he will participate in the work of the international Conference on Yugoslavia in the framework of which, in Karadzic's view, Bosnia-Herzegovina will be discussed most during this week.

In his statement to TANJUG shortly before his departure for Geneva, Karadzic reflected briefly on Alija Izetbegovic's suggestion that a cease-fire be established in Bosnia-Herzegovina during the winter. "A winter cease-fire means continuation of war," Karadzic said, continuing: "What is going on in Bosnia-Herzegovina is certainly not a game of chess. We do not want to suspend the war when Alija Izetbegovic is in a difficult position only to have it flare up once he is in a better position. We favor peace and a political solution to the crisis, and do not accept any temporary cease-fire."

Reflecting on the progress of the Geneva conference, Karadzic said the problem rested with the fact that many things are being perceived partially and that there are tendencies to demand unilateral concessions from the Serbs, something that is upsetting the strategic balance. "We are no longer going to tolerate this. I am referring to our aircraft and heavy artillery, which constitute the only balancing lever of the Serbian side, while the Muslims and Croats have more numerous armies than ours and have, of course, very good weapons. We are no longer going to offer unilateral concessions because we have done this on so many occasions while the other side has always failed to respond," Radovan Karadzic said prior to his visit to Geneva.

Medicine, Surgical Equipment 'Urgently Needed'

AU2909152292 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 29 Sep 92

[Text] The Republican Headquarters for Health and Social Security of Bosnia-Herzegovina reports that the hygienic and epidemiological situation is still dangerous, although the number of reported cases of enterocolitis is gradually declining. So far, 6,562 cases of enterocolitis have been registered in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 3,084 of them in Sarajevo. Citizens are warned to take extreme precautions with water and food.

The shortages of medicine and sanitary materials in Bosnia-Herzegovina are becoming increasingly pronounced. The worst shortages are reported in Jajce, Visegrad, Jablanica, Zepa, Maglaj, Tesanj and Zenica.

The most needed sanitary material is gauze, bandages, and external fixers [vanjski fiksator], and also every kind of surgical equipment is needed. As for medicine, infusion solutions are desperately needed, as are antibiotics,

analgesics, disinfection agents, anesthetics, cardiotonics, and antihypertensives. [Word indistinct] oxygen, and oil for aggregates are urgently needed in Sarajevo.

According to the latest information from Jajce, Tesanj, Maglaj, Srebrenica, Tuzla, Travnik, Zenica and Sarajevo, 32 people have been killed, and 212 wounded in the last 24 hours, of which 15 killed and 90 wounded were in Sarajevo.

UNHCR Says 400,000 Winter Deaths Possible

AU2909191492 Paris AFP in English 1854 GMT 29 Sep 92

[Excerpt] Geneva, Sept 29 (AFP)—The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) warned Tuesday [29 September] that up to 400,000 people could die this winter in Bosnia-Herzegovina but the international aid airlift to the war-torn republic looked set to resume.

UNHCR spokeswoman Silvana Foa told reporters here that the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina was "desperate" with the approach of winter. "It's already too late," she said. "Up to 400,000 could die."

"We have now a situation where people are unable to return home, they are unable to seek asylum, they have nothing for the winter. We are going to see a lot of people die," she said, adding that the international community must provide emergency assistance. [passage omitted]

Aircraft Bomb Iron Works; Other War Reports

AU2909130292

[Editorial Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian at 1100 GMT carries reports on the war situation:

In his dispatch from Sarajevo Security Services' Center, Irfan Calo says that "the entire territory of the free territory of Vogosca is being shelled, while the enemy infantry troops are firing at Zuc."

Correspondent in the studio Ljiljana Rado says: "As we have learned from Zoran Misetic, reporter of the independent CD radio from Zenica, at approximately 1100 two enemy aircraft carried out combat activities against the territory of Zenica. According to the preliminary reports, the aircraft dropped their lethal load on the buildings of the Zenica iron works. Data on possible casualties and material damage are not known yet." She also says that "after seven to eight days of the aggressor's attacks on Bugojno and the nearby settled areas," the town was relatively peaceful yesterday.

A report from Tesanj by Abdul Rahmacolic says "the enemy's artillery yesterday evening pounded our positions in Mrkotic, Radusa, Palje, Sije, and Lepenica." He says that the enemy this morning tried to break through the lines of defense in Miljanovci with infantry. "The attack was driven back," the correspondent says, and adds that "as of this report, the enemy aircraft have

overflowed the commune on several occasions." "The artillery fire at our commune is intensifying," the correspondent concludes.

Correspondent in the studio Ljiljana Rado then states that "the Serbo-Montenegrin aggressor, after a relatively peaceful night, resumed the aggression against the Doboj region this morning." The same report says that "the enemy" has been shelling Bihac commune and the outskirts of Cazin commune since early morning, especially the positions of the defenders at Grmec-Serbian plateau, Sokolac, and Golubovici as "he cannot come to terms with the fact that he has lost extremely important strategic locations." She also reports that "the defenders of first Velika Kladusa brigade scored considerable successes" by moving the line of the defense by several kilometers and thus "creating conditions in which the enemy no longer has a free access to this region."

West's 'Indecisiveness' Seen 'Radicalizing' Muslims

92BA1424A Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in
Serbo-Croatian 3 Sep 92 p 2

[Article by Branko Tudjen: "Jihad at Europe's Doorstep"]

[Text] In the corridors at the London conference, most of the talk is on two topics: the meeting between Kohl and Mitterrand a few days before the conference and the possibility of a Muslim holy war, of a "jihad" in Bosnia-Herzegovina [B-H]. The second topic was particularly emphasized by a banner carried by Bosnian protesters in front of the conference hall: "Jihad is the only solution for Bosnia," and also by the dissatisfaction of Izetbegovic and his delegation in the course of the conference.

On the basis of what we know with some reliability, the French president tried to persuade the German chancellor to submit to the division of Herzegovina into Serbian and Croatian parts. Kohl rejected that idea and stuck firmly to his earlier view, which is also supported by Washington, that there is to be no territorial division of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Those differences were also evident in London: Washington and Bonn on the one side and Paris and, to a somewhat lesser extent, London on the other.

It is of interest that Moscow is now boasting that Butrus-Ghali and Russia saved the conference. What probably happened is that among the principal factors, behind tightly closed doors, the firm positions of the United States and Germany on the condemnation of Serbia and unchangeability of borders came up against

the more tolerant views of France and Great Britain. The decisions based on principle and the harsh condemnation of Serbia, but without clear indication that military intervention against Serbia will follow if the sanctions do not succeed, are perhaps the result of a compromise. Perhaps disagreement over intervention is the reason why Belgrade is saying that it fared well in London. Because one thing is certain: Serbia has decided on force and has been applying it, and force is the only way to oppose that force. If the powerful people in the world are not willing to use force, then Belgrade rightly calculates that its logic of force will triumph in the end.

What does Paris want with the division of Herzegovina? To satisfy Belgrade and Zagreb with concessions? For example, it knows that without peace in eastern Herzegovina there will not be a single tourist in Dubrovnik, and without trade between eastern Herzegovina and Dubrovnik and the coast there will be no life for the Serbs in Herzegovina. But perhaps it has a different intention? Perhaps Paris wanted by this act to "pull a fast one" on Zagreb. To set a precedent which later could be the basis for saying that the so-called krajinas or certain parts of them should belong to Serbia.

The West's differing views and its actual disunity, aside from encouraging Serbia, is also radicalizing Muslim views. The unwillingness to undertake military intervention against Serbia is creating the possibility that the region of the former Yugoslavia, B-H in particular, but also Europe, could become the battlefield of a jihad. THE SUNDAY TIMES of London has been reporting on the hundreds of mujahedin from the Islamic world who are already fighting on the territory of B-H. Arab mujahedin fighters, the newspaper says, have upset the Bosnian Croats, who are afraid that at the end of the war they could turn Bosnia into an Islamic republic. The leader of the mujahedin in Bosnia, Abu Abdel Azis, who spent six years in Afghanistan, told the London newspaper that they have two objectives in Bosnia: one is the jihad, that is, holy war, and the other "dava," that is, the teaching of the true Islam.

After Reis-ul-ulema Jakub Selimovski himself, the chief Muslim religious leader for the territory of the former Yugoslavia, was attacked and wounded by a Serbian projectile in Sarajevo, after Alija Izetbegovic's statement "We need freedom, but not peace," and after the London conference failed to decide in favor of what Serbia is using (force), it is almost certain that the jihad is entering the door of Europe. In its disagreement and indecisiveness, the West will face an issue much more entangled than the problem of people asking for asylum.

Tudjman, Izetbegovic, Boban Discuss Military Pact

LD3009020392 Belgrade TANJUG in English
0039 GMT 30 Sep 92

[Text] Zagreb, September 29 (TANJUG)—Leader of the Muslim administration in Bosnia-Herzegovina Alija Izetbegovic and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman started talks on Tuesday [29 September] evening on the implementation of a new military pact signed last Wednesday in New York. According to an anonymous Croatian official, no details regarding the talks which were also attended by leader of Bosnian Croats Mate Boban would be released, said REUTERS news agency.

The Izetbegovic-Tudjman pact foresees the setting up of a committee for military coordination against Bosnian Serb forces in the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Yugoslav Prime Minister Milan Panic in a letter to U.N. Security Council President Jose Ayala Lazo on Tuesday, cautioned of the serious consequences of this military pact which represents an attempt at legalizing Croatia's military presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Panic recalled that U.N. reports had confirmed that 30,000 members of the Croatian Army and 10,000 members of irregular units from Croatia were militarily engaged in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The U.N. have confirmed that there is not one single Yugoslav soldier in Bosnia-Herzegovina territory, said Panic.

Statement Released on UN Helicopter Incident

LD2909200792 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in
Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 29 Sep 92

[Text] According to a Croatian Defense Ministry statement, Croatian Army members noticed two unidentified and undeclared helicopters without any visible identification in a direct pass near Gornji Vuksinci in the Vrbovec municipality at 1713 on 26 September.

When these flying objects were about one and a half km from Croatian Army units, one soldier fired seven projectiles from an 20mm anti-aircraft gun. He fired on his own initiative without any orders from a superior officer. The flying objects were neither hit nor downed, and they did not return fire, continuing to fly northward.

A subsequent investigation by NCO's established that these were UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] helicopters, which landed undamaged at Zagreb airport at 1725 GMT.

Members of the Vrbovec police station, together with the military police, who arrested the soldier, carried out an on-the-spot investigation. An investigation is being conducted by members of the 67th Military Police Unit Crime Prevention Squad, together with members of the Zagreb police station.

The Croatian Defense Ministry informed the UNPROFOR about this incident and extended its apologies. The culprit will be dealt with in line with Croatian Armed Forces legal regulations, the Defense Ministry statement stresses.

UN Troops Prepare To Block Refugees' Return

AU2909195692 Paris AFP in English 1934 GMT 29 Sep 92

[Excerpts] Zagreb, Sept 29 (AFP)—Croatian authorities appeared to back down Tuesday [29 September] on plans to return thousands of refugees to their homes in Serbian-controlled areas of the republic after U.N. officials warned the move could spark widespread bloodshed.

That came as 1,500 U.N. troops prepared to block roads into the eastern Croatian city of Osijek to prevent refugees returning there. The eastern Croatia U.N. commander, Russian Colonel Alexander Khromshenkov, warned that the return of refugees, reportedly to be accompanied by armed Croatian soldiers, could reignite the war in Croatia.

Deputy Prime Minister Mate Granic, speaking a day before an estimated 20,000 Croatians were to try to regain their homes in eastern Croatia, said that "no one can take on the responsibility" for ordering a move "that would put human lives in danger."

Granic was quoted by the HINA news agency as telling representatives of the eastern cities of Osijek, Vinkovci, Vukovar and Baranja who had led plans for the homecoming that "special Serbian police" had been mobilised and re-armed to prevent the refugees' return.

He said U.N. forces would be unable to protect the refugees. It is important to know, he said, if the refugees will be going home "under conditions of security or if they are stepping into the unknown."

In Osijek, the main organizer of the refugees' return, Deputy Mayor Branimir Glavas, told AFP: "Personally I don't think the refugees will begin their movement Wednesday." Although Croatian officials had earlier insisted the refugees would head home Wednesday, Glavas said this was not a deadline for their return, but only "a suggestion given to the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to indicate when the return might take place."

He said refugee leaders would meet later Tuesday to discuss their plans and "will in any case advise the UNPROFOR 24 hours before any movement." [passage omitted]

Serbian forces have threatened to shoot returning refugees, many of whose homes have been occupied by Serbs as part of an "ethnic cleansing" campaign aimed at paving the way for merging parts of Croatia into a greater Serbia.

Some 900 Russian and 600 Belgian troops serving with the United Nations in eastern Croatia were set to block the main roads into Osijek Wednesday to halt any refugee return, local U.N. officials told AFP. [passage omitted]

Return of Refugees Could 'Spark' Full-Scale War
AU2909084192 Paris AFP in English 0323 GMT 29 Sep 92

[Text] Erdut, Sept 29 (AFP)—A plan by several thousand Croats to return to their homes this week in northeastern Croatian territory under Serbian control could spark a return to full-scale war in the area, U.N. officials say.

"The situation is currently very tense," said Russian Colonel Alexander Khromtshenkov, who heads the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the area. "The decision taken by the Croats to send back the refugees is a violation of the U.N. peace plan and could provoke a return to war."

Khromtshenkov said, "The security conditions have not yet been met to allow such an operation," adding that his peacekeeping forces would oppose "with all possible means" the planned return on Wednesday [30 September] of more than 20,000 refugees to the Baranja region, which has been occupied by Serbs since October 1991.

Speaking here in the UNPROFOR headquarters in the self-proclaimed Serbian Republic of Krajina, Khromtshenkov said he was particularly concerned by reports that the refugees would be accompanied by armed Croatian security forces. Serbian forces in the Baranja region have threatened to use force to prevent the refugees' return, while Khromtshenkov noted a fresh Serbian mobilisation in the region following the announcement of the refugees' planned return.

"We still hope that good sense will prevail and that this plan will be abandoned," he said.

Croatian refugees in Hungary, where about 50,000 people have fled since war broke out in former Yugoslavia last year, are also reported to be planning to return to their homes in Serbian-occupied territory in the eastern Croatian region of Slavonia.

The representative of the United Nations high commissioner for refugees in Zagreb, Thomas Birath, warned Monday against such a move on the grounds that UNPROFOR could not guarantee the refugees' safety if they returned. The Hungarian news agency MTI reported him as saying.

Khromtshenkov said U.N. forces were planning to carry out the disarming of 2,000 Serbian police in Baranja within the next few days, under moves along with the removal of landmines in the area, aimed at paving the way for an agreement between Serbs and Croats on the return of the refugees. But he said the refugee plan,

which was announced by the mayor of the Croat city of Osijek, had pushed back plans to demilitarise Baranja.

"The problem of the return of the refugees is extremely complicated and we cannot expect to find a solution in the short-term," Khromtshenkov said.

Khromtshenkov's deputy, Belgian Colonel Pierre Peeters, said some 900 Russians and 600 Belgians in the U.N. forces would block roads in the area in an effort to prevent the return of the refugees, but added that the peacekeepers could not patrol the whole border between Croatia and the territory controlled by the Serbs.

The Krajina authorities have said they are counting on UNPROFOR stopping the return of the refugees. Krajina's president, Goran Hadzic, said Monday, "If we have to fight, what will happen will be like last night when we liquidated a group of Croatian terrorists who were trying to infiltrate our territory."

Article Alleges Ethnic Cleansing Continues

AU2909122392 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 25 Sep 92 p 6

[D. Veselcic report: "'Blue Helmets' Inefficient Witnesses"]

[Text] Vinkovci—Blandina F. Negga, UN coordinator for civilian issues for Sector East, has written a report to the Croatian Government concerning the eviction of Croats from the village of Svinjarevci, saying that conditions in her sector are rapidly deteriorating. She says that evicted Croats have recently been subjected to repeated torture by the Chetniks and local "militiamen," who call the women "Ustasha mothers," and threaten to murder the men. The UNPROFOR has decided to provide safe passage for Croats to places under Croatian Army control, after a group of people from Svinjarevci took it into their own hands to cross to Vinkovci via Mirkovci. They were stopped in Mirkovci by the Serbian police and returned to Orolik, where they were put under UNPROFOR protection.

This is just one example from Negga's report. Speaking to THE GUARDIAN, Negga said that, during the last few weeks, the Serbs have killed over 50 Croats and other non-Serbs in Sector East. She also spoke of ethnic cleansing, which consists of killing, throwing explosive devices into homes, verbal threats, and moving Serbs into Croats' homes. Negga claims that this ethnic cleansing has been very carefully planned, and that it cannot be stopped since the UNPROFOR's mandate does not cover preventing refugees from escaping into UNPA [United Nations Protected Areas]. She admits that there is still a significant amount of weaponry in this area, as the protection forces have not yet managed to carry out the disarming.

This is the briefest of descriptions of conditions in the occupied areas of eastern Slavonia. Events of the last few days clearly show that the Serbian plan is still being

perfidiously carried out, and that no incident or provocation is coincidental. Therefore, one is not surprised to hear about the mortar attack on Vinkovci two nights ago, as it came before 30 September, when the return of refugees to some villages is planned. The Serbs are trying to delay the return of refugees at all costs—using force and threats. That is why they attacked Vinkovci, so they can claim that the refugees cannot return while fighting is still going on.

UNPROFOR watches all this helplessly, and just notes it down. It is becoming very clear that only a tiny part of Vance's plan is being carried out, so nobody was really surprised by that mortar attack, even though the UNPROFOR has been saying for a long time that all heavy artillery is either under its control or pulled back from the occupied territory. It is no problem to hide a few mortars, not to mention anything about infantry weapons. Eastern Slavonia is obviously heading towards new days of uncertainty.

Assembly Passes Law on Amnesty for War Crimes

LD2609012992 Belgrade TANJUG in English
2242 GMT 25 Sep 92

[Excerpt] Zagreb, Sept 25 (TANJUG)—The parliament of the former Yugoslav Republic of Croatia passed in a summary procedure on Friday [25 September] a law on the amnesty of "the perpetrators of crimes in the armed fighting in the war against the Republic of Croatia" from August 17, 1990, to the present day.

"The Law on the Pardon and Non-Prosecution of the Perpetrators of Crimes in the Armed Fighting in the War Against the Republic of Croatia" was tabled before parliament by the Croatian Government on Friday. In explanation, it was said that the law was to pave the way for lasting peace, a relaxation of tensions and confidence among the peoples of Croatia.

Between 20 thousand and 30 thousand Serbs in Croatia have been charged with "armed rebellion," "war crimes" and "fighting in a hostile army." As against this, there have been very few trials for often extreme war crimes committed by Croatian soldiers and police. What trials there have been, have been a mockery of justice and ended in acquittals. [passage omitted]

Mesic Evaluates Balkan Situation, Denies Purges

92BA1412A Zagreb NOVI DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 6
Sep 92 p 12

[Interview with Croatian Assembly Chairman Stipe Mesic by Vojo Lukic; place and date not given: "There Are No Purges in Croatia"]

[Text] One can agree with Stipe Mesic or argue with him, but he is always an interesting interlocutor—particularly now, when there is a reason. Specifically, on Monday—now it is already quite certain—Stipe Mesic will be

elected chairman of the Croatian Assembly. Mesic was the first Croatian prime minister after the first multi-party democratic elections, then the last president of the SFRY Presidency, chairman of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] executive committee, and now he will also be chairman of the Croatian Assembly. We talked with him between trips to Spain and Canada, and just before the new assembly's 7 September session.

[Lukic] Unfortunately, the war in the area of the former Yugoslavia is not over yet. You said once that you would think of Milosevic when they hanged him on Terazije?

[Mesic] I refused to shake hands with Milosevic in The Hague. I told him literally that I was not accustomed to shaking hands with criminals. Cyrus Vance and Lord Carrington were present at that conversation. He looked at me with surprise and I told him, literally: "You mobilized all of Serbia and Montenegro, you are destroying Croatian cities and villages, people are dying and being crippled, and there has been terrible damage." He said in response to this that he had not committed any aggression, that Serbia was not at war, and that we had yet to see it if he mobilized 2 million Serbs. In response to that, I told him to his face, "If you mobilize 2 million Serbs to go to war against Croatia, your own people will hang you and Borisav Jovic on Terazije. When that happens, when they hang you, I will think of you and Jovic, and you think of me, of what I told you today."

Aggressor Against the Wall

[Lukic] Now war is raging on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Is any effective solution in sight?

[Mesic] We must all know, and we all do know, who the aggressor is. The aggressor is Slobodan Milosevic and his Greater-Serbian expansionist policy. That is the real war criminal. The world has to punish aggressors and prevent aggression. You see, the participants in the London conference also unanimously condemned Serbian aggression and once again gave a guarantee that the borders would not be changed by force, that the new entity, the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia," could not be the successor to the former Yugoslavia, and that Serbia and Montenegro had to meet all international requirements with respect to the protection of minorities. I think that the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina will not end until the aggressors are threatened with military intervention, until they are put up against the wall and given a choice: Either they will cease the aggression and aggressive policy immediately, or certain military targets of theirs will be destroyed by military means.

We now have a situation in which importing weapons is prohibited in the area of the former Yugoslavia. The aggressor has an air force and tanks and heavy weapons, and we know what the defending forces are armed with, but there are no arms imports. Naturally, it cannot last long, and with respect to Bosnia-Herzegovina, a very effective and productive solution has to be found to

block that insane aggression. You know that the aggressors are also threatening certain areas in the Republic of Croatia from Bosnia territory. Let me just mention Bosanska Posavina, where our villages and cities are exposed to daily savage bombing by the aggressor's artillery. The basic thing, I repeat, is to stop the aggressor, and then the three constituent peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina will agree on models for coexistence in that area. Bosnia-Herzegovina is a friendly country, it is a UN member, and we have recognized it. If this war on Bosnian territory continues, however, I am afraid that more and more new complications are possible, which will then be much harder for the international community to resolve successfully.

[Lukic] When can we expect the horrors in Bosnia-Herzegovina to stop?

[Mesic] This disaster, this terrible disaster, in Bosnia-Herzegovina has to end soon. The international community can no longer watch innocent people being massacred and killed day and night. The aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina has to be condemned, and the aggressor has to be condemned. Why is it important for that aggression to be condemned, and not rewarded by the conquest of some new territories? Simply so that this kind of evil is not repeated anywhere else in the world in some other form. Milosevic's fascist regime, which is the ideological inspiration behind all these monstrous crimes committed by the Yugoslav army or various "Arkan's forces," "Seselj's forces," the "White Eagles"—I don't know what they are all called—has to leave the political scene and has to be condemned. It would also be good for Serbia, for the people there, if democratic processes knocked on their door so that it would cease to be isolated. That will not happen as long as Milosevic and his clique are in power, however. I hear that now there is no gasoline in Belgrade, and so only half the automobiles in city transportation are operating. They have one of the highest inflations in the world, the foreign press writes that 20 percent of the population is unemployed, and 10 percent have been dismissed....

I think that many people there who applauded Milosevic and his crew will also have to come to their senses. That sobering up from the Greater-Serbian expansionist policy will be painful for the people there, but the sooner they do it the better it will be for them, because the international world community has let everyone know that aggression does not pay and that every aggressor will be punished for his crimes. Certainly punishment also awaits Milosevic's regime. The economic sanctions are only the beginning unless they stop the aggression quickly and withdraw their army from other internationally recognized countries. All of this was clearly stated to them at the London conference. The international community was resolute in its position that it will take other steps if the aggression does not stop, including measures for military intervention.

Brutal Cleansing

[Lukic] The world is also familiar with the problem of ethnic cleansing on the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

[Mesic] It is a terrible problem, which I hope the international community will not and cannot tolerate. You have seen the horrible camps on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina thanks to reporters and TV photographers, and the whole world has seen them. Now those camps have also been visited by Tadeusz Mazowiecki, a prominent Polish politician and diplomat. Along with that brutal cleansing, however, the ethnic cleansing of territories, there are also more subtle methods. For years, for example, the number of Croats has been declining in certain parts of the former Yugoslavia. The Janjevci Croats are leaving Kosovo, the Croats are leaving Boka Kotorska, and now people are also finally talking about the problems and harassment to which Croats have been subjected in Srijem, Backa, Banat, in Serbia.... I personally am astonished by the newspaper report that the nuns are leaving Zemun. They had a hospital there that was their property before World War II. Now, because of the terrible pressures, the nuns are leaving Zemun. I heard that some bomb also exploded in front of the door of their nunnery in Zemun. You know and have probably read about everything that happened in the Hrtkovici village, and so I think that it is not necessary to repeat it.

[Lukic] The Croats outside Croatia are living in very difficult conditions, under pressures. What can Croatia do for them?

[Mesic] Those pressures have already been discussed by the Belgrade archbishop, His Eminence Dr. Franc Perko. His words, expressed in the press, are extremely disturbing. Belgrade Archbishop Dr. Franc Perko is also a Slovene by nationality, and for years was a professor of ecumenical theology at the Theological School in Ljubljana. You see, the size of the Croatian population is also declining in Boka Kotorska. The priests of the Kotor diocese have been subjected to incredible pressures, as I have read and heard. Don Branko Zbuteaga has also talked a lot about this in our mass media. In any case, we also call Boka Kotorska the "bay of saints." Let us recall the Franciscan Capuchin Bogdan Leopold Mandic, who during his life—and he spent most of his life in Padua—spread good, especially among pilgrims who came from Boka. And instead of continuing the lesson of the Franciscan Capuchin Bogdan Leopold Mandic, we have the same thing in that Boka, according to Don Branko Zbuteaga, a truly difficult situation for the Croatian population, which has done nothing to deserve it. That is why I am mentioning Bogdan Leopold Mandic, who fought his entire life for peace and understanding among people, especially in his Boka Kotorska. A lot of people from Boka live in Zagreb today, and now they cannot visit their families, their dearest ones in Boka. In Montenegro, along with the Kotor diocese, we also have the Bar archdiocese, which celebrated its 900th anniversary a few years ago. I still hope, however, that we will achieve

such relations that Croats will be able to live wherever they want, and that outside Croatia they will not be harassed and persecuted in various ways just because they are Croats. We are willing—and we have said so in all our documents—to give national minorities those rights sought from us by the international community, but we have the right to be concerned about our diaspora, wherever it is located in the world, including neighboring countries that are now independent but were formerly integral parts of the SFRY.

Spring Without UNPROFOR

[Lukic] Recently, six months passed since the arrival of UNPROFOR [UN Protective Force] in Croatia. Do you think that after a year, it will be necessary to extend the UN forces' mandate in Croatia?

[Mesic] In the new circumstances that arose through the international recognition of the Republic of Croatia, the conditions have been created for UNPROFOR, whose mandate lasts for one year—until next March—to conclude its assignment more effectively, and so there will not be any need to extend its mandate. With assistance from the peacekeeping forces, Croatia is capable of restoring its constitutional and legal order by political means in the temporarily occupied territories. If that is not possible, however, other means will be used. We really will do everything possible to solve the problems that we have in the temporarily occupied areas peacefully. Every human life is a divine gift, or if some atheist prefers, he can call it a gift of nature. That is why we have always advocated solving all the problems peacefully, and having as few people as possible suffer and die. Naturally, this was not always possible, and when we were attacked we had to defend ourselves. We defended ourselves as well as we could, and with assistance from a truly wonderful people. Even though we were in a technologically inferior position, we defended Croatia; we defended our homeland. Today we have a strong Croatian army, which is better equipped every day. Our enemies also know that. That is why I think that we will solve all these problems with respect to UNPROFOR peacefully. People talk about occupation. Well, we had all of Croatia occupied after World War II! It was occupied by the Yugoslav communist regime. Today we have liberated three-fourths of the territory, and we will liberate the remaining fourth. Do not be concerned.

[Lukic] Can you still specify when the refugees will be able to return home?

[Mesic] I know that it is not easy for our refugees; it is hard to be without one's own home, but believe me, it is our priority problem and we will try to solve it as effectively as possible. Croatia today is an internationally recognized country, a member of the UN, and that gives us an opportunity to place all the problems we have before the international community. You know that for 40 years, from World War II to the HDZ's victory, Yugoslav communist diplomacy spread the most odious lies about Croatia, the Croatian people, and the Croatian

land. It was not easy to fight in the world against those lies, against those inventions and monstrous schemes. Our people sometimes forget this. But thanks to our leadership, headed by Dr. Franjo Tudjman, we have succeeded in having Croatia become a model country, respected and valued in a European and world framework because of its just and honorable struggle for its autonomy, sovereignty, and independence.

United Croatian People

[Lukic] How do you view the second elections, in which the HDZ once again won convincingly, and the results in the diaspora, which, expressed in percentages, are even better than in the homeland?

[Mesic] The HDZ has united the disunited Croatian people. Croats at home and those who emigrated have been united. The HDZ has achieved everything that it promised. The voters could appreciate this, and that is why they gave us their trust again. The fact that we won among the diaspora as well is one more proof that the diaspora, although far from its native soil, definitely knows how to assess what we have done on the international level as well for the affirmation of our homeland. The extreme right here received fewer votes than the extreme right receives in some countries with a much deeper democratic tradition. That also demonstrates the maturity of our electorate and our people. After these elections, our position in the world improved even more. This was also perceived at the London conference. We ascertained that people in the world were still keeping track of what was happening here, and that they could appreciate this victory of ours, which really was a big one.

[Lukic] What is your opinion of the so-called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which no one has recognized?

[Mesic] No one is prohibiting Serbia and Montenegro from uniting in some new state, but that new state has to seek its own international recognition. Serbia and Montenegro cannot be the SFRY's successors. This was said in the end by the Badinter commission. I think it is clear today to everyone in the world. I think that even Serbia is starting to realize that that trick with the FRY did not succeed and cannot succeed, even though Bora Jovic announced that they were Yugoslavia, and that all of us—both Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia—were some sort of separatists. That small-town policy, that primitive policy deprived of any legal basis, collapsed before the European experts headed by the Frenchman Badinter.

Hard To Reach an Idyll

[Lukic] How do you view relations with the neighboring countries, for example, with the Republic of Slovenia?

[Mesic] Academician Ciril Zlobec, who also spoke about Slovene-Croatian relations, recently made a guest appearance on the pages of NOVI VJESNIK. Mr. Zlobec said, more or less, that many people in Slovenia, as well

as in Croatia, were scandalized by individual awkward problems that were arising in relations between the two countries. Zlobec said that it was expected on both sides that idyllic relations, so to speak, had to prevail between us because of our recent history. Nevertheless, as Zlobec says, in the daily life of the Slovene and Croatian states there are so many conflicting problems and relations—and new ones will occur—that we cannot expect any sort of idyll in relations between them. I would like to say that as far as Slovenia is concerned, we have to build our relations on new foundations, since we are now two independent states. We have certain advantages, since there are longstanding contacts between our businessmen, cultural and public figures, athletes, etc. All of these are preconditions for us to build high-quality economic and all other relations, to our mutual benefit, and not at anyone's expense. I think that we have all the conditions for succeeding in this.

Naturally, there will be certain problems, but there is no reason why we cannot solve them to our mutual satisfaction. You see, Croatia has airports in Dubrovnik, Split, Zadar, Losinj, Rijeka, Pula, Zagreb, and Osijek. In the former Yugoslavia, we know, the airlines were JAT [Yugoslav Air Transport] in Belgrade and Adria Airways in Ljubljana. Naturally, we in independent Croatia are now also developing our own national company, both for the sake of our domestic transportation requirements, and also for the sake of our businessmen and emigrants throughout the world. We will allow foreign companies to land at Croatian airports, but under the conditions under which this is done everywhere in the world. This is just one of the examples that a lot has been written about in the Croatian press, but also in the Slovene press. We also want to have good and friendly relations with Bosnia-Herzegovina. Generally speaking, we will try to achieve the best possible cooperation with all the neighboring countries in all fields.

[Lukic] In speaking about the organization of the new state, a great deal of attention has been aroused in recent days by the announced "purge" of incompetent personnel from the state administration and public enterprises.

[Mesic] I do not like to use the word "purge," and I am against any purges whatsoever. We know where purges were conducted—in the Soviet Union that does not exist today. Croatia is faced with great tasks in rebuilding the completely devastated homeland; we have to accelerate the process of transformation, privatize the economy—something in which we have already done a great deal—but, I wish to emphasize, we must likewise emerge from the socialist system, which means that we have to change the tax, customs, and legal system. Croatia has to do away with all the remnants of the socialist bureaucracy. The state administration has to be effective, more efficient, and naturally smaller in size; it has to serve the citizens. We saw what happened in the past months with the issue of residence permits—the lines were hundreds of meters long.... That was intolerable, and it was unnecessary. I think that that job could have been organized

more efficiently. You know, there are people in the administration who are incompetent, and there are people who do not want to do that job the way that it should be done. It is necessary to get rid of those people, but that is not any kind of purge, much less any sort of dismissal of people who are unsuitable. I don't know how anyone can even think that way. We want an administration organized according to European standards, and that is all.

Activities of Croatian Death Squads Detailed

92BA1405F Zagreb NOVI DANAS in Serbo-Croatian
31 Aug 92 pp 20-23

[Article by Veceslav Kocijan: "Are the Death Squads Coming?"]

[Text] The arbitrary dispensing of justice, bombings, murder, disappearances of people, and the inefficiency or benevolence of authorities toward the perpetrators—there are too many similarities with the Latin American prototype.

Are there death squads in Croatia? Assistant Minister of Internal Affairs Zdravko Zidovec says that "he has no knowledge" of any detachments that have taken the law into their own hands in Croatia. "There are no death squads in Croatia, or at least we do not know of any. At this very moment, work is under way on a paper—that is what we call it—that will be presented to the committee dealing with this problem very soon, so that there are also official assessments about all of this." Do the frequent murders, which could easily be termed political, or the rows of houses destroyed by explosives belie the tranquil tone coming from the Ministry of Internal Affairs? Zidovec's response to that question is vaguely fatalistic: "These murders that are happening, are happening. We know the areas in which they are most frequent. The same is true of the planting of explosives in homes and cars. They are happening most frequently in the areas affected by the war. But naturally they are also happening elsewhere.... In any event, I feel that in no case is this an organized effort."

However, people who are better informed do not agree with this assertion by the assistant minister of police. The latest series of murders bears them out, and all of this together is provoking a general feeling of insecurity among people already on pins and needles after everything that has happened to us over the past two years. Naturally, such an atmosphere is in fact favorable to the arbitrary dispensers of justice, who are threatening to bring Latin America to us instead of letting us join Europe.

When Latin America came face to face with death squads, all their victims were brought under the same denominator—"enemies of law, order, freedom, and democracy." During the 1970's and 1980's in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and later in Colombia, El Salvador, Nicaragua..., based on almost the same pattern, charging state institutions with incompetence and ineffectiveness, part

of the police apparatus took things into its own hands. Hiding behind slogans about defending the state, they in fact used terror, murder, and exile to eliminate political opponents and in this way consolidated the position of the existing authorities. When the Death Squad was formed in Brazil in the early 1970's, the policemen who set it up asserted that it was an organization formed only to fight crime and that the Brazilian police could not make headway against organized criminals through legal means.

A Hundred Bullets

Indeed, at first the Death Squad did liquidate several well-known criminals, which naturally met with citizen approval, but it soon turned out to be the case that it was in fact taking action primarily against opponents of the military regime in Brazil, and thus training their weapons at areas where the regime's official organizations were powerless.

The police in Chile also killed and tortured political opponents without trials, but in contrast to the situation in Brazil, it made no effort to hide behind unofficial organizations and the fight against crime, but instead openly eliminated opponents of the fascist Pinochet dictatorship. In Argentina, there was a police terrorist organization known as AAA—Alianza Anticomunista Argentina (Argentine Anticomunist Alliance)—with methods very similar to those of the Brazilian squads, which condemned opponents of the regime to death and gave them 48 hours to leave the country. Otherwise, they would be liquidated by 100 bullets—a sort of signature of the AAA organization—but first the victims would be brutally tortured, burned, their hands cut off.... But in Argentina, a response was soon forthcoming in the form of an organization of leftist Peronist Montoneros, which answered terror with terror.

Bombing Campaigns

For the most part, the targets of the not exactly secret organizations that marauded Latin America were all those who through their actions, ideas, or even inclinations did not fit in with the notions harbored about their cities and countries by members of societies "for law and order," who advocated violating laws in the name of defending legality. In this way, liquidations of prostitutes, homosexuals, and even alcoholics began. The dimensions that the arbitrary dispensing of justice assumed are reflected by the fact that in the mid-1980's in Colombia, for example, 51 percent of the population over the age of 15 died violent deaths.

Shortly after the 1990 elections, with the rise in passions, the first bombing campaigns against enemies of all colors began. First, everything in the Knin region that was not Serbian was blown up, but a reaction to this was not long in coming. Thus, in the areas not far from the Knin barricades, and even beyond, Serbian houses and property began to be bombed. The anger that drove people to

take this sort of retaliatory action is completely understandable, but the state was apparently too short-sighted to react strongly enough to these illegal acts in order to earn the epithet "rule-of-law" at the very outset. Since there was no reaction by those in charge of defending law and order, something that can probably be justified by the situation at the time, where the police was simultaneously the Army as well, individuals and groups took advantage of this in order to engage in systematic bombing, which today, as even Assistant Minister of Internal Affairs Zidovec acknowledges, has achieved "critical mass." "Not a day goes by when several houses are not blown up in the critical areas. Unfortunately, the number of perpetrators of these terrorist acts—as I would freely call them—who have been exposed is not especially favorable for the police, and we are objectively dissatisfied with the results of investigations in the areas of the explosions. Moreover, we feel that the teams of criminalists dealing with these cases should be reinforced, and these terrorist acts are currently becoming the central concern of the police," Zidovec says.

However, it appears to be a little late, because in the meantime not only houses and cars, but also people have increasingly become the targets of those who have taken the law into their own hands. It all began with the liquidation of the top police official in Osijek, Reihl-Kir, followed by the murders of Paradzik, Mate Sabic.... But these cases can simply be called a precursor of what is to come. The first to be accused of mass persecution and liquidation without trial was in fact Tomislav Mercep during the battle of Vukovar, two months before the full blockade. At the time, the government's commissioner for Vukovar, Marin Vidic-Bili, sent a letter to the government, but also to other high-ranking addresses, in which he mentioned the then secretary of national defense precisely in this context. This was followed by Mercep's not exactly voluntary departure from the city, but also by his surprise promotion to the post of advisor at the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Was that already a sign that the state was ready to close both eyes and support not exactly legal methods of fighting enemies of the state and of order? In any event, Mercep made an excursion to Gospic, after which people began to mysteriously disappear there as well, although this time it appears to have been much better organized. When the events in Gospic began to make it into domestic and foreign newspapers, but also into reports by organizations for defending human rights, the top ranks of the police provided assurances to the effect that work was under way on that case and that results would be forthcoming very soon.

Suspicious Deaths

One of the military commanders of Gospic was arrested, but then quickly released, which then-Minister of Internal Affairs Ivan Vekic explained as "an order from above." Moreover, the military commander in question was promoted to a higher officer's rank, and was often seen in the company of members of the Security Information Service [SIS] of the Ministry of Defense, so that

many people have alleged that he himself is a member of that organization. After that, there was silence about the Gopscic case.

It is rather unlikely that it is a coincidence, but upon the arrival of Tomislav Mercep at the battlefield in western Slavonia, stories began to arrive from that region too about liquidations of ethnic undesirables, but also of politically unsuitable Croats. During that period, the Zec family was liquidated in Zagreb, and since that happened at the very time when international recognition of Croatia was anticipated, the perpetrators were apprehended in an improbably short period of time. They were members of Mercep's never officially recognized unit, Mercep's Branch. Another 10 members of that unit were arrested and charged with murder, but also with other crimes, primarily in the area of Pakrac Poljana, so that criminal charges were even brought against Commander Mercep based on the first interrogations of the arrestees. However, the district attorney never issued a request for an investigation of the police advisor, despite the fact that his name was mentioned several times in the notes from the interrogations—indeed, as the man who issued the liquidation orders.

Again coincidentally, under a ruling by the Supreme Court of the Republic of Croatia, the notes from the first interrogation of Mercep's proteges were removed from the file on this matter, thanks to a legal technicality, and the accused continued to defend themselves through silence. As a result, the accused were released despite their initial confessions, and Tomislav Mercep withdrew from the public eye for some time. Whether this was new confirmation of a certain benevolence by the authorities toward those who illegally, but nevertheless efficiently, release potential or actual enemies, or perhaps evidence of the powerlessness of the legal system in time of war, is left entirely up to the newspapers. Many people were killed in exactly the same way, but there were no reports of the perpetrators ending up behind bars. There were similar cases in Karlovac, Zadar, Sisak.... Now, after the death of the commander of the Sisak Wolves, Jadranko Garbina, some are willing to allege that he was the very man who directed actions against enemies of "freedom and democracy" in the Sisak and Banija area, so that all of this combined even becomes part of the context of his own, according to some suspicious, death in a traffic accident.

There are too many similarities with actual death squads for what is happening in Croatia not to be worrisome. Specifically, it is apparent that in some sense the state tolerates events "in the field" and that no one has yet to answer for certain acts that at the very least draw into question Croatia's hard-earned reputation in the world. In addition, the apparent participation of members of regular police and Army forces in such actions, as well as the rightwing, conservative positions that they support, is an irresistible reminder of the groups that ravaged the "green continent." The only question is to what extent these informal groups for the dispensing of justice have managed to become institutionalized and what sort of

government support they enjoy. Specifically, it is possible that their activities were made possible by obstructions set up to block certain government circles, although the latest events indicate the possibility of conscious exploitation of the atmosphere of general uncertainty in order to shore up the existing authorities.

Too Many Coincidences

The latest case in particular—the murder of Gen. Kraljevic—indicates that the state does not even intend to hide its informal activities any longer. Once again, there are too many coincidences to believe. For example, Zivko Bodulic from Posedarje, one of the two men killed on the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] side, an SIS lieutenant, was suspected of a murder that took place not that long ago on Pag during clashes between inhabitants of Poveljana and Posedarje. Afterwards, he disappeared without a trace, only to turn up dead following the murder of Blaz Kraljevic as a member of a counterterrorist unit that was placed at the control point toward Mostar.

Well-informed sources contend that Bodulic was in continuous contact with the Croatian minister of defense, which sheds a different light on the entire case and on his objective. Another interesting detail from that case is that the autopsy on the dead HOS [Croatian Defense Force] and HVO members, who were immediately transported to the hospital in Split, was not performed by personnel from Split; rather, a special team was brought in from Zagreb.

This was soon followed by the bombing of the Mercedes of Marinko Bozic, the owner of ST [expansion unknown], which Bozic claims was ordered by authorities at the very top, while recently the young vice chairman of the HSP [Croatian Rights Party] for Markusevac, Robert Tupek, was also killed.

Some contend that he was first strangled and then blown apart by five kilograms of explosives, but that seems less important right now. What is really interesting is the absurd fact that in the majority of these so-called political murders the victims are those whom the state leadership (or HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community], if you prefer) incessantly accuses of extremism—the HSP. It is strange that thus far HSP members have patiently allowed themselves to be murdered, successfully hampering those "angry blades" ready for retaliation in kind.

Recently in Hercegovina, a commander of an HOS company wounded three of his boys in the leg in order to prevent the entire company from setting out to retaliate for HOS members that had fallen by Croatian hands.

However, the situation in the HOS is more than seething, and the question is: What are the limits of tolerance? At a time when everyone is armed to the teeth, the only result can be fratricidal chaos. Supposedly well-informed sources contend that a decision to form units to liquidate political nonsympathizers has been officially adopted. It

seems almost blasphemous to list the names of the people alleged to have participated in the secret meeting held somewhere in the period following the last elections, where that decision was supposedly adopted.

It is said that they are very high up in the Croatian Government, which is actually hard to believe. Naturally, the time ahead will provide the best confirmation or refutation of the existence of this decision. If the stories are true, no one will be safe, because the issue of our time is when certain other criteria of unsuitability will be applied, not only political ones. And to be killed for wearing too short a skirt or having one drink too many would certainly be absurd.

Croatian-Muslim Rift Blamed on Intelligence Unit
92BA1424F Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in
Serbo-Croatian 9 Sep 92 p 13

[Article by F. Vukoja: "The Dogs of War Are Barking"]

[Text] Siroki Brijeg—In spite of numerous agreements and understandings guaranteeing the unity of Croats and Muslims in B-H [Bosnia-Herzegovina] against their common Serbian enemy, pernicious disagreements advantageous to the enemy have very often been seeing the light of day in the field and in the media. Who is causing the split between the Croats and Muslims?

The Serbocommunist KOS [Counterintelligence Service], by waging special warfare through its backward "pockets" at the very top of the B-H political leadership and the Army has been spoiling the harmonious relations, which these two nationalities have had for centuries, i.e., their natural political and military alliance. Those who are morbidly dependent upon equal distance in the B-H media must invent some kind of "Ustasha" for every Chetnik! They are spreading rumors about the specter of cantonization which Boban is allegedly carrying out under Tudjman's directives, although this has to do with ethnic communities and constituent units in accordance with the European concept, which Izetbegovic himself has adopted.

The immense successes of the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] are being played down by such people, precisely those whose survival the HVO made possible through western Herzegovina and central Bosnia. Those morbidly dependent on Yugoslav equidistance equate Serbia's genocidal campaign of conquest in B-H with Croatia, a state that has unselfishly, in Samaritan fashion, received and cared for their mothers, wives, and children. It is precisely these people who are equating the temporary government of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosnia in order to maintain the life of territories defended and liberated with Karadzic's phantom "Serbian Republic of B-H," when the logistics and military assistance of the HVO, and indeed also the HOS [Croatian Defense Forces] and the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosnia, have decisive importance to the defense both of the Muslim regions and of B-H as a whole.

The most vociferous spreaders of lies are members of the "naval forces"—that is what they call the copper-colored Bosnians capable of waging war who are sunning themselves at the shore. The dogs of war are barking, and they did not see the Chetnik caravans passing.

Those morbidly dependent on equidistance could hardly wait for the sorrowful tribute of blood paid in Croatian lives and the lack of forethought in the blind collision between police of the HVO and the group of the HOS.

Even in Croatia there are newspapers who for the sake of circulation often unintentionally (?) contribute to the split in relations between Croats and Muslims in B-H. In vain, Croatian and Muslim intellectuals call for reason and a common alliance, because the dogs of war in KOS pockets in the media, the top political leadership, and the B-H Army are barking and casting out bones of dissension.

Let us recall only that media flea (read "bomb"), which Radio B-H dropped, which was encouraged from the very top leadership of the republic concerning the alleged agreement between Boban and Karadzic, although civilian targets in western Herzegovina were at the same time bombarded in the most bestial fashion. Is it not high time to declare war on the remnants of the KOS in the Bosnian media, Army, and government?

Babic Talks About Return to RSK Political Scene

92BA1424D Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 31
Aug 92 p 11

[Interview with Milan Babic, president of Knin Opstina and of the Krajina Serbian Democratic Party, by Srdjan Radulovic; place and date not given: "Friends Behind the Wings"—first paragraph is BORBA introduction]

[Text] Dr. Milan Babic, president of Knin Opstina, is again back on the job after "coming to his senses" in Benkovac, and, judging by the recent joint party appearance with Rade Leskovac, leader of the Krajina SRS [Serbian Radical Party], he has also begun to resume political activity as president of the Krajina SDS [Serbian Democratic Party], sufficiently to belie rumors about his return to dentistry. The following is an interview following the end of the London conference and in a situation when the krajina political scene is increasingly burdened with problems and internal conflicts.

[Radulovic] How do you assess the London conference and the performance of the delegation of the RSK [Republic of Serbian Krajina]?

[Babic] The essential approach to the Yugoslav problems at that conference did not differ from earlier ones. There is a difference in the increased pressures on Serbia, Montenegro, and the Serbs in the Serbian Republic. As for the participation of the RSK delegation, we need to recall the invitation for presence at the peace conference in Yugoslavia, which was held last October in The Hague. We were invited to take part in the proceedings

of the subcommittee for ethnic minorities, but we rejected that and opposed that manner of resolving our issue. A conversation with Ambassador Wynands was nevertheless organized in Paris in order to hear our opinion. The invitation of a representative of the Serbian people to the London conference was based on the same principle as our earlier invitations, and I have not heard that anyone before departure had any objections to that status of the Krajina delegation.

Uncritical Trust in Serbia

[Radulovic] Under those circumstances, what chance if any is there that someone represent the RSK and that the views of the Krajina delegation will be honored?

[Babic] The question of the status of Krajina (SAO [Serbian Autonomous Oblast] Krajina) had a key place in the earlier conferences on Yugoslavia, but now this question has been pushed into the background. Even the representatives of the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] sometimes mention the Serbs in Croatia, but not the Serbian Republic Krajina. The position of representatives of the RSK, regardless of who is representing the interest of the RSK and under what circumstances, must be based on the effort to obtain the status of an equal principal and participant in the talks, the same status as the other participants in the talks within the former Yugoslavia, because the Serbs in Krajina are an equal nationality, not an ethnic minority. This view must also be represented in case of negotiations with Croatia, which must be preceded by recognition of the status of equality in those talks. It is certain that that will be difficult for anyone who represents the RSK under these circumstances, but it is up to all of us to help and to warn that this is the basic point of departure which must not be departed from, regardless of personal unpleasantness or persuasion by "friends" that we relent.

[Radulovic] Who are those friends?

[Babic] They are still on the scene, although they have moved a bit behind the wings.

[Radulovic] Did those "friends" help in removing Milan Babic?

[Babic] Our weakness in the RSK is uncritical confidence in Serbia, and also this trust is often turned into trust of those who are in power in Serbia. Our weakness is also our dependence in these circumstances of the isolation of the RSK. Krajina is exposed to manipulations from Serbia.

The Role of Minister Martić

[Radulovic] Recently, Milan Martić, minister of internal affairs, dissolved the Krajina DB [State Security Service]. Although this has not been officially confirmed, we have heard that the main reason lay in the connection between that DB and the Serbian SDB [State Security Service], through which the talks were channeled. Is there any basis for those assertions?

[Babic] When we began to create the state community and institutions, we estimated that the segment of internal affairs was very important, just like what we might call State Security, which at that time might more appropriately have been called "national security." Exactly 13 months ago the RSK government, which I headed, made a decision to abolish the DB as a branch of the old services and other services not inclined toward us. We intended to replace that service with another one that would not have been involved with internal espionage and meddling in political relations, but with protection of the national interests of Krajina. Actual relationships and the balance of power did not allow realization of that idea. One of the reasons lay in the role of Milan Martić, who was protecting those branches and who as a minister in that government did not want to carry out the decision that had been made. That service later played a large role in the campaign and recruitment of people to bring the new team to power on orders from Belgrade.

[Radulovic] Is there a similar scenario being acted out now with Milan Martić as the target, and could there be a rapprochement between Babic and Martić?

[Babic] It would be strange for someone to wage a campaign against Babic's political options and for Martić at the same time to be targeted by those same people. The difference between us lies in position. I would independently assess political relations and present the interests of Krajina, but he quite frequently had an uncritical attitude toward people who have been shown not to have been inclined toward us. Now, he himself has realized that, but the consequences are still there.

Cooperation With the SRS

[Radulovic] Your return to the political scene is related to the joint effort with the Serbian Radical Party for Krajina.

[Babic] It is not a question of a political rapprochement of the SDS of Krajina and that party. The SRS is a new party in these parts whose political objective is still undefined. I personally am in a dilemma as to what kind of radicalism they represent, left or right. But it is not my place to define the policy and profile of another party. In this specific case, it was a question of an offer to join the SRS in commenting on the removal of Minister Dobrosav Vežović. Because the Krajina SDS did not even take part in his election, because he came like all the others in an established puppet regime, I felt it was better to make a joint statement about the London conference and on that occasion present views about the status of Krajina. The Radicals drafted a "Declaration" whose content we agreed on over the phone, but there remained one passage which for objective reasons I could not influence, and that went out to the public. It had to do with the option of Krajina's confederal relation with Croatia. My view is that we must first win the right to self-determination and then on the basis of that right the Serbs in Krajina will vote on their future in a plebiscite. My personal opinion and the position of the Krajina

SDS is that the RSK join the other segments of the Serbian people or be a sovereign republic.

[Radulovic] Your renewed political involvement has started up rumors about what is referred to as scheming against the government. You have ties with a group of members of special forces who took part in one fight in Knin, and after that there were political manipulations with that case, and it seems with those people as well.

[Babic] Certain young people made an offer to me that they would resolve this chaos by their own methods. I believe that they have a large measure of respect and patriotism, but

I told them that we want to create relations in the RSK in such a manner that all citizens feel free. These relations can be regulated exclusively by democratic means, just as the government can obtain legitimacy exclusively in democratic elections. It seems to me that they have understood me. Personally, I do not want violence, nor is it good to respond to violence with violence. At this moment, any violence and chaos in the RSK is actually disastrous for us. Unfortunately, it will also be disastrous if this system of power is retained without a democratic underpinning, because it has turned into a system of arbitrariness and personal rule in many areas of the life of society.

Platform for Drnovsek-Sarenic Talks Examined

AU2909170392 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in
Slovene 1430 GMT 29 Sep 92

[Bojan Veselinovic report]

[Excerpt] We interrupt this newscast again to tell you that, while you were listening to the previous report, the Sociopolitical Chamber again checked the numbers and concluded that it had achieved a quorum. Although deputies demanded the appearance of Prime Minister Dr. Janez Drnovsek—Stanko Buser, deputy of the Slovene Peoples' Party, was the loudest in this—it was deputy Foreign Minister Zoran Thaler who addressed the deputies. Allow me to tell you about some of the main points of the report that the deputies are supposed to endorse before the forthcoming Drnovsek-Sarenic [Croatian prime minister] meeting and before the visit by Croatian President Tudjman to Slovenia.

Thaler said he hopes that isolated cases of worsening relations can be perceived as a reflection of the present moment in the process of regulating mutual relations. According to Thaler, Croatia is demonstrating greater readiness for the resolution of open issues, which are: borders, trade, fishing, tourism, and energy. Slovenia is striving for an integrated approach to resolving these issues in several packages. Croatia still has not ratified the economic agreement, Zoran Thaler said, although the agreement was signed in February this year. Croatia made the ratification of the agreement subject to an appendix to this agreement; however, at the last meeting the Croatian partners accepted the original text. This means that non-customs duties [izvencarinske dajatve] introduced in June will be abolished together with the reciprocal measures introduced by Slovenia.

The position of the Zagreb branch of the Ljubljana Bank was the topic of today's talks by Slovene Finance Minister Gaspari and Bank of Slovenia Governor Arhar with their Croatian counterparts in Otocec.

As regards the highways in Slovenia, it looks as if we will come to an agreement with Croatia on building the Sentilj-Zagreb highway. Concerning open access to the sea, Thaler said that this is the right to which we are entitled, according to an international convention. If complications continue, this problem will be internationalized.

He also expressed the hope and the belief that the forthcoming meeting at prime ministerial level, and the meeting between Kucan [president of the Slovene Presidency] and Tudjman will help to smooth out the misunderstandings. During the visit the negotiating powers that were given by the Slovene Assembly will be assumed. [passage omitted]

Assembly Adopts Political, Electoral Laws

AU2909204092 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in
Slovene 1430 GMT 29 Sep 92

[Excerpts] Slovene Assembly deputies will still have to coordinate the adopted laws on political parties and electoral campaigns after the Law on Deputies was adopted by all three chambers. There are now no obstacles to the president and assembly chairman scheduling elections for deputies to the State Chamber, president, and State Council, because, as Bojan Veselinovic reports, the three basic electoral laws have been adopted.

[Begin recording] Along with the basic electoral laws which have already been adopted, the laws on voter registration and establishment of electoral districts for the State Chamber were necessary in order to be able to hold elections by the end of the year. These were adopted at the previous assembly session. Also adopted was the law establishing electoral districts for the State Council, which took its final form today. Nineteen districts have been created for this chamber [passage omitted]

The Law on Deputies was adopted in all three chambers. According to the new law, the deputies will serve full-time. They may not be government members simultaneously, and they will receive a salary which will be five times the average personal income. The salary will be reduced if they fail to attend chamber and committee meetings. After their term expires they will receive compensation for one year, while they use that time to look for a new job. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Slovene Export Insurance Agency Established

92BA1419B Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 9 Sep 92 pp 1, 3

[Article by Tonja Slokar: "Insured Exports"]

[Text] The contract on founding the Slovene Export Company [SID] has already been signed by more than 70 shareholders; the company will start to operate in mid-October. Among other things, the Slovene export bank will also deal with insuring export transactions against political risks; contracts with Hermes and SACE soon.

Ljubljana, 8 Sep—We have obtained a Slovene Hermes. Today, in fact, 74 shareholders have signed a contract on founding the Slovene Export Company (abbreviated SID), a company for insuring and financing exports. The export company has not yet completely come to life as a result, but it is expected to begin operations in mid-October, when a shareholders' meeting will also officially found it and appoint its leadership.

The company's initial basic capital, which the shareholders have to deposit by 21 September, amounts to 647 million tolar, or \$8 million. This capital is to be increased gradually, so that by 1 April 1994 at the latest it is to amount to 2.8 billion tolar, or, calculated according to the fixed exchange rate that was in effect the day before the signing of the contract, \$35 million. The

state, which is the majority shareholder and in the long run is supposed to keep a 51-percent share in the company's basic capital, will have \$30 million of this, and all the other shareholders (so far 73 of them have applied, but the door is still open to new ones until 21 September), including banks, insurance companies, and enterprises, will have \$5 million. In the first issue of shares, the state will thus have considerably more than 50 percent, but this will be reduced to the contractual percentage when the basic capital is increased by issuing new shares, since foreigners will also be able to purchase them, but at most up to a 15-percent share, along with individuals and private firms, at most up to 20 percent of the capital. It is supposed to be possible to purchase the shares in the second issue as early as a year from now.

According to Dr. Zlatko Mursec, who has been authorized by the Foreign Ministry to coordinate the tasks in establishing the company, its most important task in the beginning will be to insure export transactions, foreign investments here, and our enterprises abroad against political risk, and also against commercial risk, together with insurance companies.

From now on, the headquarters of the newly founded SID will be on Josipina Turnograjska Street in Ljubljana. The office spaces, 481 square meters in size and worth 90.6 million tolar, will be contributed by the Ljubljana Bank stock company, as its contribution to the company. Nova Gorica's Gostol, for instance, will invest computer equipment in the company, and the Business Information company in Ljubljana will invest in the company the right to access and use its database of business reports.

According to Dr. Zlatko Mursec, in the beginning the export company is supposed to be most involved in insuring export transactions against political risks, and only later will it insure them against commercial risks,

together with insurance companies. It will issue guarantees and superguarantees for medium-term and long-term transactions. It will also gradually start to be involved in refinancing export loans from banks and other financial institutions. In particular, it will refinance loans (previously insured against noncommercial risks) for exports of equipment and vehicles, for the construction of complete installations and capital investment projects abroad, for renting and leasing equipment and vehicles abroad, for purchasing goods and services abroad in settlement of claims abroad, etc. The Finance Ministry will give its consent for loans that exceed \$1 million and guarantees larger than \$3 million.

Dr. Mursec also said that the company now had too little capital for all export requirements. That is why they have decided for the time being that they will only cofinance exports of equipment and vehicles, capital investment projects abroad, and opportunities to sell equipment for leasing. We will thus only be able to calculate how much of an effect on encouraging exports the export company has after two years, since insurance against political risks, which essentially also stimulates exports, cannot be weighed with figures.

So far, none of the shareholders has contributed its founding share in the form of claims, although the shareholders also include enterprises like Metalna, for instance. According to Dr. Mursec, they will be able to do so.

The Slovene Export Company that is being founded has also already established contacts with similar foreign companies. They have visited Germany's Hermes and Austria's Kontrol Bank, which are prepared to sign bilateral contracts with us, especially for technical and training assistance. Cooperation will also be important for the exchange of all sorts of other information. Similar agreements are also to be signed with other prominent insurance companies, such as Italy's SACE and the American Eximbank.

Federal**Army on 'Forcible' Return of Croatian Refugees***LD3009012892 Belgrade TANJUG in English
2224 GMT 29 Sep 92*

[Text] Belgrade, Sept 29 (TANJUG)—Croatia is regrouping its troops and bringing fresh forces to Slavonia in order to seize Baranja, Western Srem and eastern Slavonia, and support the forcible return of Croatian refugees to the U.N. protected areas, the General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia said on Tuesday [29 September].

The three regions are located in the eastern part of the Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK). The RSK was formed by Serbs on the predominantly Serb-populated areas, as a reply to Croatia's secession from Yugoslavia.

The Yugoslav Army said it had informed the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) about Croatia's military preparations for the return of refugees.

Director of the UNPROFOR Civilian Affairs Cedric Thornberry said in Zagreb on Tuesday UNPROFOR was ready to prevent any attempt by Croatian refugees to enter Baranja, Eastern Slavonia and Western Srem.

In Slavonia (eastern Croatia), there are nine brigades of the Croatian army with 12,000-15,000 troops, supported by over 50 tanks, the Yugoslav Army specified. In Spacvanske Sume, Croatia has deployed another two armoured battalions, and artillery and missile units.

According to the same source, a forcible mobilization in many parts of Croatia will raise the number of troops in Slavonia to 30,000.

The Army of Yugoslavia cannot peacefully watch the preparations for an aggression, and will be compelled to take adequate measures if force is used, the army said in a statement.

However, it added, the Yugoslav Army General Staff is confident that UNPROFOR will consistently follow its obligations, which would help avert the use of force by any of the sides.

Croatia's preparations have been encouraged by a tacit or direct support and help by some Western countries and international organizations which are declaring themselves for peace despite the fact that they have practically approved the Bosnian-Croatian military pact, the Yugoslav Army said.

The military pact, recently signed between Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and Moslem leader of Bosnia-Herzegovina Alija Izetbegovic, is aimed against Serbs in the RSK and the Serbian republic in Bosnia-Herzegovina, formed in predominantly Serb-populated areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Moslems in Bosnia-Herzegovina have been helped by Mojahedins, trained in a centre near the German city of Munich and then sent to Bosnia via Croatia. Italian

instructors in Kukes, Albania, are training Albanian extremists from Kosovo to provoke massive unrests in the Serbian province, the statement said.

Ethnic Albanians who are a national minority in Serbia and Yugoslavia want to secede from their state and join neighbouring Albania.

The so-called intensive peace initiatives by some countries and organizations are aimed at concealing the facts and creating the conditions for armed activities, said the Army of Yugoslavia.

Djukic Asks UN To Retain FRY Flag, Symbols*LD2909224392 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2044
GMT 29 Sep 92*

[Text] New York, September 29 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Foreign Minister Ilija Djukic in a letter to U.N. Secretary-General Butrus Butrus-Ghali on Tuesday [29 September], requested that the flag and other symbols of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia remain where they are in the seat of the United Nations.

Djukic's letter followed after Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina representatives in the U.N. requested the removal of Yugoslavia's symbols from the General Assembly and the flagpost outside the U.N. building.

There was confusion over the blue-white-red flag last Tuesday, when it was first lowered, only to be hoisted up again. No reasons were given, but it has been learned that the flag was returned after the U.N. Secretariat's Office for Legal Affairs intervened.

Djukic points out that the U.N. Security Council resolution, whose recommendations were adopted by the General Assembly on September 23, do not refer to the country's membership, but only to its participation in the work of a particular U.N. body. Djukic believes that the U.N. Secretariat was correct in its interpretation of the decision.

Djukic recalls in the letter that the General Assembly president's spokesman had said that the matter did not pertain to membership, but to the participation of Yugoslav Government representatives in the work of the General Assembly, and that the flag and name of the country would remain in their places.

These are also the interpretations of the resolution's sponsor. The British representative, in proposing the resolution to the General Assembly, said that under it, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia representatives would not be sitting in "Yugoslavia's" place in the General Assembly or any of its bodies. Djukic believes that the implications are clear: there are no Yugoslav representatives, but the name and place remain.

Djukic says that the Russian and Chinese representatives had interpreted the resolution in the same way when passed by the General Assembly. The Russian representative said that the decision did not in any way

affect Yugoslavia's participation in other U.N. bodies, the work of the Yugoslav mission in New York, or the retaining of Yugoslavia's name in the General Assembly and elsewhere. The Chinese representative was of the same view.

On the basis of this, Djukic has requested of the U.N. secretary-general to leave the symbols where they are, in accordance with the U.N. Secretariat's interpretation.

With the exception of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, none of the other member countries have brought up this question so far.

Issue of Jovanovic Resignation Discussed

92BA1435E Zagreb NOVI VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 12 Sep 92 p 22

[Article by Ivkica Bacic: "Political Games in Belgrade: Did Milosevic Order Jovanovic To Resign in Order To Provoke Crisis in Panic Government? Resignation 'as Assignment'?"]

[Text] Belgrade—The explanation offered by the (now former) head of diplomacy in the Panic government, Vladislav Jovanovic, in his irrevocable resignation—emphasizing that he "cannot remain in a government that is pursuing, with increasing openness, a policy that is in conflict with the interests of Serbia and the Serbian nation," and that some of Panic's actions "are deeply inconsistent with my conception of national duty and dignity." That explanation, and the very act of resigning, constitute a new mine planted under Panic by Serbian politics, following the fiasco that it underwent in the Serbo-Montenegrin parliament.

One need only recall that a mere month ago, Minister Jovanovic said that it was an honor to sit in Panic's cabinet and that he did not feel the least bit inferior in relation to Panic, who had opened many doors on the international scene; doors that had been firmly shut, and not only to Jovanovic. However, one must also remember that Panic was forced to agree to Jovanovic as minister of foreign affairs because Slobodan Milosevic did not approve of Zivorad Kovacevic, Panic's choice for that post. The conflict in Panic-Jovanovic relations began then, according to some sources, because the latter, as Slobodan Milosevic's man, bitterly defended a policy that had been rejected by the entire world and that, in Panic's words, had lost all competitors on the international stage.

Panic himself accepted Jovanovic's resignation without hesitation, saying that he has "exceptional respect for the person and capabilities of my former minister," but added that "between us there exist differences in style and in approach to the conduct of foreign policy. Apparently the government's policy demands different people," Panic said.

A statement by the vice chairman of the Serbian Assembly, Vukasin Jokanovic, proves that Jovanovic's

resignation came "as an assignment" from the top echelons of Serbian politics, the apparent goal of which was to provoke a crisis in the government (the withdrawal of certain other people from Panic's cabinet, who are otherwise members of the ruling Socialist Party, has already been announced). Jokanovic said that "Panic's moves and behavior prompted Jovanovic to resign." In a similarly parenthetical fashion, Jokanovic also announced the reinvigoration of the question of confidence in Panic and his government because, as he said, the criticism of Panic recently voiced in the Serbo-Montenegrin parliament is "only now gaining weight." It is also worth mentioning what the chairman of the Serbian socialists, Borisav Jovic, said in the latest issue of NIN, which should also be regarded in light of the new socialist attack on the U.S. Serb whom, it appears, they carelessly brought in from California.

Jovic emphasizes in NIN that "what Europe and the United States have asked of us in The Hague and Brussels, and now in London, is that we renounce the equality of the Serbian nation in relation to other nations. If we had to accept everything that they asked of us and agree to everything, then we would not need Milan Panic. We could have done that on our own," said Jovic, adding that "the SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia] cannot agree to such concessions and sacrifices. The world would not be satisfied with mere personnel changes in the current Serbian Government. They seek a government that will sacrifice the interests of Serbs and part of Serbian territory. I do not know whether such a government will be found, but we cannot go down in history as the betrayers of our people," Jovic said explicitly.

In contrast to Jokanovic and Jovic, Milenko Radic of the Depos [Democratic Movement of Serbia] leadership feels that it was a "major mistake for Panic to even agree to the appointment of Jovanovic to his cabinet. In that way," Radic says, "precious time was lost with a man who represented the baleful policy of Slobodan Milosevic in Panic's cabinet." Radic also says that Jovanovic belong to the team that brought Serbia into a state of isolation unprecedented in its history, and as a result of the policy that Jovanovic represented on the international scene, Radic emphasizes, "more than a million Serbian citizens are economically ruined, hundreds of thousands are displaced, and tens of thousands have been wounded and killed."

Epidemics Due to 'Shortage' of Drugs Feared

92BA1444B Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 14 Sep 92 p 4

[Article by B. Popovic: "Drugs Available Only for Most Urgent Cases: Serbia Facing Epidemic"]

[Text] New cases of tetanus at Infectious Disease Clinic; shortage of antibiotics and antimalarials; shortage of solution for counting blood elements; no tests for Hepatitis B.

In recent weeks, three cases of tetanus have been recorded at the Tropical and Infectious Disease Clinic of the School of Medicine. This means that there will be more of them, says Dr. Bozidar Antonijevic.

"Besides the already chronic shortage of absorbent cotton, gauze, alcohol, disinfectants, and insecticides," Dr. Antonijevic explains, "the clinic does not have enough antitetanic serum and antsnakebite serum. We have requisitioned so-called bovine serum, which has actually not been in use for some time now, but it is better than nothing. Before that we imported only 20 'tetabulina' from Austria, which were used up entirely—and now we have no reserves whatsoever. We are returning to the long since superseded, although proven, methods of treating many infectious diseases. In addition, the clinic does not have enough of many types of antibiotics and antimalarials, and we are the only institution that treats tropical diseases—to say nothing of food and patient rations, which have not included meat for several months now."

"We are especially hard hit," says Dr. Antonijevic, "by the shortage of solution for counting blood elements, since it is known that many infectious diseases are detected by analyzing the blood test."

"Besides this, a greater influx of AIDS patients has been recorded at the Clinic recently (there are 17 of them), and there are no antibiotics to treat them. Although we have enough tests for AIDS, there are no tests for Hepatitis B and C. And as we know, hepatitis B is an occupational disease, so that even we doctors cannot be tested," says Dr. Antonijevic.

"Naturally, as long as health care is managed with no regard for realistic prices, what has happened now will continue to happen because there is an abundance of 'tetabulina' at private pharmacies, but the price is 14,700 dinars, while the Health Care Fund pays us 4,100 dinars for the same serum."

For example, leukocytic formula cannot be made at any health care institutions in Croatia and Serbia for lack of dyes for hematological and bacteriological blood analyses, and blood analyses—which are one of the most common indicators of many latent diseases—are being conducted less and less frequently. According to epidemiologist Dr. Vlada Ljubisavljevic, the same is true of equipment for sampling feces and urine. There are no cartridges and vials, no materials for slides and coverslips (necessary for microbiological medicines), there are no needles or syringes, and no disinfectants or alcohol. Thus, all the conditions for the emergence of epidemics are present. If it were not for the church, charities, sponsors, and the sense of camaraderie among health care institutions loaning whatever they have to each other, then epidemics would have already been circulating around Serbia.

Amiability, friendship, personal ties, and sponsorship are also providing the Neurosurgical Institute of the

University Clinical Center with its operative requirements. The basic criterion, according to institute director Dr. Vasilije Antunovic, is that the most urgent patients—those with brain tumors and brain hemorrhaging—are not turned away. Everything must be for them, at least for now. Everyone else (so-called cold operations, where the patient's life is not in jeopardy for the time being) must wait. If such shortages continue, however, it is possible that patients will have to learn to live with that, precisely because there are no drugs, Dr. Antunovic warns.

Dr. Antunovic emphasizes that "the level is somehow being maintained, thanks to resourcefulness. We are counting on sponsorship (but from where?). However, there is no more suture material, we are already having a hard time with sanitary material, there is a shortage of clips for brain aneurysms, drug reserves are running out...."

Serbia

Referendum on Early Elections Scheduled for 11 Oct LD2909133492 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1234 GMT 29 Sep 92

[Excerpt] Belgrade, 29 Sep (TANJUG)—A referendum in which citizens of Serbia will vote on whether the republic needs early elections will be held on 11 October 1992, the National Assembly of Serbia decided at its emergency session today.

Under an earlier proposal, the referendum was going to be held on 4 October but the Assembly deputies endorsed a government amendment to postpone it until 11 October to give enough time to finalize preparations. [passage omitted]

Radical Party Questions Competency of Panic, Cosic LD3009053892 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2253 GMT 29 Sep 92

[Text] Belgrade, September 29 (TANJUG)—The Serbian Radical Party (SRP) group of deputies, the strongest opposition party in the Yugoslav parliament, raised the question of the "constitutional competency" of Yugoslav President Dobrica Cosic and Prime Minister Milan Panic to negotiate on the state border with Croatia.

In a letter to president of the Yugoslav parliament's Chamber of Citizens Jugoslav Kostic, the radicals led by Vojislav Seselj demanded that the question of Prevlaka, a peninsula on the Yugoslav-Croatian border be placed on the agenda of the October 2 session.

Prevlaka is a peninsula at the entrance to the Boka Kotorska Bay and the Yugoslav Navy is anchored there.

Until Croatia's secession, Prevlaka was within its administrative borders. However, Yugoslavia is now

demanding it, considering that the peninsula is of no importance for Croatia, but does enable it to control the whole of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's coast.

The radicals claim that "negotiations are ongoing for determining Yugoslavia's state border in the Prevlaka area," and that Cosic and Panic are discussing the issue with "international subjects" but without the parliament's approval. The federal parliament is the only body "competent" to decide on changes of the country's borders, according to the letter.

In negotiations with co-presidents of the Conference on Yugoslavia Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen on two occasions in September, Cosic and Panic agreed to the demilitarization of Prevlaka to be followed by negotiations on its future.

The Radicals and the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) demanded that the federal parliament take a vote of confidence in Prime Minister Panic and his government in early September. Panic received a vote of confidence and the green light to pursue his policy, based on the lifting of economic and political sanctions introduced against Yugoslavia in late May by the United Nations.

Kosovo

Police Arrest Democratic League Activists

AU3009074592 Paris AFP in English 2357 GMT
29 Sep 92

[Text] Belgrade, Sept 30 (AFP)—Police in the troubled Serbian-ruled province of Kosovo have arrested five top leaders of the province's main political party, the group said in a statement received here late Tuesday [29 September].

The Kosovo Democratic League, which represents the large ethnic Albanian majority in the province, said the five were detained late on Monday as they returned from a trip to neighbouring Macedonia by car.

The Serbian authorities had made no official announcement of any such arrests by late Tuesday. The statement said the five were still being held.

The arrests came the day after TANJUG news agency announced that a group of 19 ethnic Albanians had gone on trial in the province's western town of Pec on charges of preparing an uprising aimed at unifying Kosovo with the neighbouring state of Albania.

The 19 were alleged to have obtained arms from "foreign military experts," the agency said.

The Democratic League statement named the party's arrested leaders as Edita Tahiri, Anton Kolaj, Hazir Krasniqi, Qefser Baholli and Ymer Rama.

Bozovic Rejects Special Status for Hungarians

LD2709201492 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network
in Hungarian 1700 GMT 27 Sep 92

[Text] Serbian Prime Minister Bozovic has stated that his government rejects every concept that recommends the granting of special status to ethnic Hungarians living in Vajdasag [Vojvodina]. According to Bozovic, one has to try to support the improvement of coexistence and everything must be done in the interest of strengthening tolerance between nationalities.

Macedonia

Gligorov Urges Economic Cooperation

92BA1435F Zagreb NOVI VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian
12 Sep 92 pp 12, 21

[Interview with President Kiro Gligorov by Dragan Djuric; place and date not given: "There Were No Secret Accords With Serbia"]

[Text] We spoke with Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov at a time when Macedonia had just gotten a new government, headed by the chairman of the Social Democratic Alliance [SDS] of Macedonia, Branko Crvenkovski. The new government is in fact pursuing a policy whose basic tone was provided by Gligorov, and which is still generating plenty of confusion among the public. One of the basic doubts that has emerged, especially in the Croatian press, relates to the recent meeting between Milan Panic and Gligorov in Ohrid, where supposedly an alliance of Macedonia with Serbia and Montenegro was agreed to.

We began our interview with the most recent charges by the opposition VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party of Macedonian National Unity] concerning the election of the coalition government. Since Albanian parties are also participating in that coalition, the VMRO-DPMNE feels that this is pushing Macedonia toward federalization of the republic, which will end with the handing over of territorial autonomy to the Albanians, which, in that opposition party's opinion, is the beginning of the partition of Macedonia.

[Gligorov] Well, a change in government is a normal thing. We have had a change in government for the first time since the formation of an independent Macedonia. In other republics, this happened much earlier. The new government's handling of the elections was completely in accordance with the Constitution, which contains a provision specifying that the mandate can be accorded to the party or parties that ensure a majority in parliament.

There were three attempts to form a new government. The mandate was first entrusted to the VMRO-DPMNE, but it was unable to ensure the coalition that was necessary, because based on the results of the election no single party has enough deputies to be able to form a

government on its own. The mandate was then entrusted to the Social Democratic Alliance, but mandator Petar Gosev returned the mandate after he became dissatisfied with the cooperation among parties concerning the choice of individual members of the government. The same coalition, which has a majority, offered a second candidate, who succeeded in forming a government. As far as the Constitution and procedure are concerned, everything was perfectly in order.

Agreement With Albanians

[Djuric] But the appraisal is that the new government is in fact communist?

[Gligorov] That objection does not hold up, because the coalition includes all parliamentary parties except for the VMRO-DPMNE. Even some nonparliamentary parties are participating in it, such as the Democratic Alliance of Turks. The agreement reached with the Albanians, under which they too will participate in the coalition, is something on which stability in Macedonia depends. If there is anything that I emphasized to everyone to whom I entrusted the mandate—the VMRO-DPMNE and the SDS and the coalition—it was that we need to have as broad a coalition as possible, in which representatives of the Albanian minority in Macedonia must be included. This is very essential for peace and stability in the republic. I see nothing bad about the fact that they will share in the responsibility for the Macedonian state and for everything that will happen here. On the contrary.

[Djuric] Can the federalization of Macedonia be avoided?

[Gligorov] If the Albanians were not participating in the government and had not found their place in society, then they would fight for federalization. Especially if they were marginalized and thrown out of political and public life, as is happening in Kosovo. In that case, extremes are inevitable. The agreement by Albanian parties to join the coalition is an indication of their moderate course, which gives the new government opportunities to implement its program.

[Djuric] Various interpretations of your talks with Prime Minister Milan Panic in Ohrid have circulated among the public. Rumor has it that you agreed on that occasion that Macedonia would enter into an alliance with the Belgrade-Podgorica "Yugoslavia." There is even talk of some sort of secret accord.

[Gligorov] There is no secret accord whatsoever. That is pure speculation. I am always willing to talk to all figures who have relevant influence in this region. There was also a great deal of criticism when I met with the chairman of the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo, Ibrahim Rugova, even though everyone knew that he is a top-ranking political figure. One must always talk and, without ignoring the realities, refine relations and gradually glide along toward various settlements and forcible actions.

Panic suggested that we meet, and I accepted in order to see what, in fact, he was offering. That talk could not have any elements of some sort of agreement on a future, confederal relationship between Macedonia and Serbia and Montenegro, or rather present-day Yugoslavia. I have emphasized many times, including at a meeting with Milosevic, that Macedonia's primary goal is to gain independence and full international recognition, and then, as an independent and sovereign state, to cooperate with all its neighbors. There was no talk of any sort of political-legal relationship.

Otherwise, Panic put forward the idea of forming some sort of Balkan economic union. I told him that this idea about Balkan cooperation in various forms, all the way up to a Balkan confederation or federation, is an old idea of the Macedonian liberation movement. Macedonia's position is such that without cooperation with its neighboring Balkan states and efforts to reach some sort of agreement with them, there will always be an open question—what to do with Macedonia. You know that it was divided during the Balkan Wars due to its neighbors' aspirations.

Still, at the same time I said that there are certain conditions that must be met before we can talk about any sort of economic association. First of all, there must be peace in Bosnia, for which Serbia bears the greatest responsibility and where Serbia must do everything in its power to bring about peace. How can there be talk of an economic association when war is raging!

The second thing that I suggested is the mutual recognition of all former Yugoslav republics in their existing borders. Third, I mentioned that there must be a halt to the media war in order that confidence can begin returning and tolerant conditions can be created for launching a genuine dialogue.

I did not reject the idea, but that is something for the future. As far as I can tell, everyone in this region is focusing on some sort of association with the EC. The further expansion of the EC will result in the creation of regional economic associations as well. However, all of this is something for the future; the primary interest, of course, is in a cease-fire and the creation of normal living conditions.

Panic Committed to Peace

[Djuric] You speak of Panic as if he is a relevant factor in this region. However, it appears that he is still not being taken seriously, and his fate in Serbia remains a big question. Do you believe that it will even be possible for anything in Serbia to change?

[Gligorov] Serbia is in a major state of flux, to which Panic contributed in a positive sense by making it reexamine certain prevalent convictions. He has spoken several hard truths, which every citizen must consider. First of all, he expressed his commitment to the peace option, and I would almost say to peace at any price. That is still a lower price than the price of staying in the

war and being the object of possible international intervention. Accordingly, Panic's advent is positive.

However, it remains unclear whether this also means a definitive victory for the orientation that he advocates, because the balance of power in Serbia has not yet crystallized out entirely. What has happened in the Yugoslav Assembly is a victory for him, but it remains to be seen in the near future whether this is also the course that will emerge victorious.

It is true that Panic has issued several controversial statements. That was also the case with Macedonia, because he said one thing in Ohrid and then something else in Athens, at least according to how his words were conveyed by the Greek media. But in London he summoned up the strength to say that it is a disgrace for the international community that the only republic that has not been and is not involved in war has still not been internationally recognized.

[Djuric] The opinion is rather widespread that Macedonia is not strong enough to survive on its own, that it urgently needs to enter into some sort of special, which is not to say confederal, relationship with one of its neighboring states. In this context, two variants are mentioned—one Serbian and the other Bulgarian. In other words, is any sort of association with Serbia or Bulgaria on the horizon?

[Gligorov] From the very outset, when the battle to create an independent and sovereign Macedonia began, one of the basic principles of our policy has been so-called equidistance toward all our neighbors. A roughly equal orientation toward and friendly relations with everyone, but on the other hand an equal distance from everyone in terms of their inclinations toward each other or toward a third party.

Can Macedonia survive economically? Under these extremely difficult circumstances, when we too have been subject to sanctions simultaneously from Serbia and Greece, Macedonia has survived and is surviving economically. We are actually surviving the hardest part of this blockade, which is the inability to get petroleum from Salonika. Clearly we are doing so with great difficulty, but I do not think that life is a bed of roses in any other former Yugoslav republics either. We must survive this period. The future of all of us does not lie in turning in one direction, or another, or toward a third party; rather, it is in economic cooperation, which is the condition for everyone's survival. Why could Macedonia not live on its own, as long as it advocates open borders, which allow for the normal flow of goods, people, and capital?

Serious Consequences of Sanctions

[Djuric] Macedonia faces an unpleasant autumn, with the threat of a social explosion and strikes. How can one withstand this pressure? Moreover, all your official

appraisals indicate that the sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro are having a very detrimental effect on Macedonia.

[Gligorov] Among their neighbors, the sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro are having the strongest effect on Macedonia, which is a heavy burden, especially because of what our southern neighbor (Greece) is doing. Together with continuing our struggle for international recognition of our independence, which will open up the prospect of links with international financial institutions, in the coming months we will also have to mobilize whatever we have at our disposal right now in order to withstand this trying period.

Still, the advantage is that this nation and republic are not at war. Even though they are feeling the consequences, indirectly, due to the fact that they are in a region that is not living a normal economic life on the whole, since the economies of the other republics are on war footing. I hope that the crisis is nearing an end. It is in a descending and not an ascending line, even though all the dangers have yet to be eliminated. I am thinking here, for example, about what would happen if clashes were to erupt in Kosovo.

[Djuric] How important to Macedonia is the pacification and prevention of conflict in Kosovo?

[Gligorov] It is very essential. In the current situation, where there is no danger of direct intervention by the Yugoslav army, which has left Macedonia, the only direct danger is that the war will shift, which could happen if there were to be unrest and conflict in Kosovo. As neighbors, the best that we could expect would be a torrent of refugees, which could destabilize the situation in Macedonia. Although we ourselves are guarding our borders, that would be hard to prevent. In that case, one can also expect solidarity between the Albanian minority in Macedonia and the Albanians in Kosovo, which would bring with it serious consequences for Macedonia's security. It is clear that we are vitally interested in seeing the Kosovo problem resolved by peaceful means, through negotiation.

[Djuric] The conference on resolving the crisis in the former Yugoslav region led by Lord Carrington was not successful. In your opinion, what are the chances of the London Conference, and what does it signify for Macedonia?

[Gligorov] The chances of the London Conference are greater by mere virtue of the fact that all relevant political factors in the world are participating in it. It is hard to resist the pressure coming from this sort of ensemble of political factors and refuse to accept cooperation at that conference in pursuit of solutions that will not force anyone to their knees but that will bring peace to this region. I think that anyone who would reject the London Conference or who would accept it solely for tactical reasons while actually undermining it would be making a big mistake. In this phase of the famous 12 points, which are the basis for an agreement, it is helpful

that a stance has been taken against military intervention and in favor of a political solution to the problems.

If nerves become frayed in this process, then there will be no alternative but to lean toward military intervention. The form that such intervention will take is a matter for discussion at other people's headquarters.

For Macedonia, in any event, the conference in London is not a loss. The EC arbitration commission, which acted within the framework of Carrington's conference, did what it could. In its report, it confirmed that Macedonia meets the conditions for international recognition, but that factor, which was authorized by the CSCE to verify the recognition of individual states (by the European Community) did not do so, due to the Greek veto.

The Community passed judgment on us, whereby the interests of one side were directly represented while the other side, Macedonia, was absent. The London Conference, however, has been significantly broadened, and both causes are present there. First, we, like Greece and other countries, are equal participants and can promote our interests. Second, for us it is very essential that other countries are also present there, countries that are not bound by EC decisions. Accordingly, there is the possibility of political activity and decisionmaking in which this sort of one-sided adoption of Greece's position will not be possible, something that was necessary because of solidarity and the need to preserve unity within the EC.

Of course, the Macedonian question was not the central issue of the conference. The main question was the issue of war and peace. However, recognition of Macedonia is part of the overall problem of war and peace. Naturally it is not in the foreground, because there is no war going on here. But peace in the Balkans and solutions to the so-called Yugoslav crisis depend in part on how the Macedonian issue will be resolved. We are now in the process of international recognition. A number of countries have recognized us, and we have submitted our application for admittance to the United Nations.

No Disputes With Croatia

[Djuric] Macedonia and Croatia recognize each other as independent states. What is your assessment of the current level of mutual relations?

[Gligorov] As soon as we recognized each other, there should have been normal relations. From our side, we have no problems whatsoever with cooperating with Croatia on the broadest level. I am sorry that problems associated with cooperation with other republics are in the background right now, since Croatia is currently preoccupied—and that is quite understandable—with problems surrounding halting the war and preserving its territorial integrity.

We want these problems to be overcome as soon as possible so that possibilities for economic cooperation will open up, which is aggravated by the interruption in transportation and communication in general. Economic

developments are much more successful with Slovenia, which is in turn no coincidence, since that is a country in which peace has taken hold completely. A regular maritime line has been established between Koper and Durrës, Albania, which permits direct trade, and we have also concluded an agreement on reciprocal payments.

With Croatia a project has been drawn up on regularizing these relations, but it has not yet been signed, and there seems to be some stalling going on here. But these are all matters that must be normalized now. I see no obstructions to cooperation with Croatia because there are absolutely no special disputes between us.

Current Political Situation Examined

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[Article by D. Nikolic: "Political Turmoil in Macedonia: Coexistence or War?"]

[Text] *The national bloc and right-wing parties are sharply attacking the government of President Gligorov and Prime Minister Crvenkovski; the MAAK [Movement for Pan-Macedonian Action] is calling for a referendum on early elections; is the agitation among rightwing parties a sign of their weakened status, and what alternative does Macedonia have to coexistence?*

Skopje—The current government of Kiro Gligorov, under increasingly virulent attack by the "national bloc of parties" both because of the Greek blockade of the border and because of the lack of international recognition, is in an increasingly difficult position. Along the Greek-Macedonian border, four days of maneuvers by the Greek Army are beginning today under the code name "Filipos 2/92" as an extension of the "Bura 92" maneuvers begun earlier by the Greek Navy. In addition, Bulgarian Minister of Defense Aleksandur Staliyski traveled to Tirana yesterday with the "Project-Agreement of Cooperation Between the Military Ministries and General Staffs of the Armed Forces" of the two countries, which is supposed to be signed by the end of this year. Macedonia is threatened by the danger of the "actualization of Kosovo" and of the already actualized social unrest and strikes.

The day before yesterday, the national committee of the MAAK patriotic party called for a referendum in which citizens would express their opinion on early elections, for which it will be necessary to gather 150,000 signatures. It is being said that "parliament has failed the test," that Macedonia is in a serious economic situation, and that a "red ideological coalition" and an "inappropriate Albanian-Macedonian coalition" are in power, since the Albanian parties "have nothing in common with the Macedonian State." A call has been issued for the creation of a "democratic political coalition of Macedonian patriotic forces 'contrary to' the red coalition, which is currently strangling democracy." Besides the

Macedonian patriotic parties, the SK [League of Communists]-Movement for Yugoslavia has also expressed its opposition to a coalition with the Albanian parties. Allegedly, this coalition "should worry every Macedonian citizen."

The national bloc of parties expresses particular concern about the second part of the referendum issue, which provides for the possibility of "alliances between sovereign states." On this issue, the "most national party"—the VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party of Macedonian National Unity]—has sharply reproached Gligorov for not refuting Milan Panic, who said on Radio Belgrade that Gligorov agreed that Macedonia would join the "Alliance of Balkan States." According to that party, this is proof that Gligorov in Ohrid "bartered with the fate of Macedonia in secret agreements and negotiations, without legitimacy and at variance with the Constitution." Gligorov's letter to Cosic "even further confirms this assessment" as well as "Gligorov's desire to establish personal rule in Macedonia." It is thought that the latest "SAO [Serbian Autonomous Region] of Skopska Montenegro and Kumanovska Solina," which has allegedly been enacted and proclaimed, was in fact created by Macedonian newspapers "out of fear of normalizing relations with Serbia after the war is over and the sanctions are lifted, as the first step in joining 'Serboslavia.'" It appears that the entire affair is based on one suspicious letter that arrived from Svetozarevo, signed by a nonexistent "Seseljist Party in Macedonia."

A short term in office is predicted for the government of Branko Crvenkovski because of the possibility of early elections, which that government says it has nothing against, but also because of the blockade on the Greek border, which was imposed by Greek authorities as a

form of rigorous sanctions. Macedonia is in a state of collapse with regard to energy, which is inflicting enormous damage on the Macedonian economy. All previous appeals to EC authorities on behalf of lifting these Greek sanctions against Macedonia—because it will not change its name—have been fruitless. The Crvenkovski government was virulently attacked even before it revealed its program, in which it announced radical privatization and rigorous measures to counter the legal and economic chaos inherited from the preceding government. It enjoys a majority in parliament, but the referendum, if it takes place, will show whether it also has a majority among the people. The "renegade" VMRO-DP has already accused Crvenkovski of saying that the status of citizens of the former Yugoslavia in Macedonia will be settled in a uniform manner in Geneva, supposedly by "putting Macedonia in the position of a state with limited sovereignty." It is known that the national party wants all citizens of the former Yugoslavia to be given foreigner status once a law on citizenship is enacted!

The "most national party," the VMRO-DPMNE, which claims to head up the "democratic bloc of patriotic parties," indicates that it will lead the "exploited workers" in their campaign against "manager-robbers," that it will "unite all three Macedonias" without firing a shot, and that it will exclude Albanians, as well as other minorities, from government, which will be national in nature.

In the coalition parties, it is felt that the agitation on the right wing is a consequence of its weakened status "because now everyone knows where nationalist rule leads"; that it is using the coalition with the Albanian parties as an opportunity to revitalize itself on an Albanophobic basis, and that Macedonia has only one choice—coexistence or war!